libyans. each country where we have this on rest is different and it certainly syria is different than libya. we will work with the international community to condemn assad and his actions. right now, and i was at this yesterday and wanted to make it clear that we do not believe that adding to the militarization of syria is the right approach. we believe the right approach is for the international community to speak with one voice to pressure assad and get him to relinquish power and to seize the brutal assault on his own people. >> military intervention -- >> the appropriate action is a

diplomatic, economic approach. >> when the president has ruled out other proposals in the state of the union, he said -- the proposal today came from the treasury department and secretary geithner. why not have the president up front? >> i disagree -- i agree there is distance between the secretary of treasury and the president. timothy geithner has developed this with the economic team. he is laying out why he believes this corporate tax reform that he and his administration is putting forward is so important. why it fits into his overall blueprint for an america built to last. where everyone gets a fair shot. and plays by the same rules.

the president is very committed to corporate tax reform as he made clear in the state of the union address last year in 2011. he believes this is an area where an opportunity exists. an opportunity to disapprove the conventional wisdom that nothing can get done in an election year between a white house held by one party and a congress controlled by the other. after all, there is a fair amount of consensus that simplify the tax code is a good idea. a broadening the base and lowering the rate is a good idea. the president has put forward a proposal that does that. in doing that, i t eliminate unnecessary and expensive subsidies and carved out special provisions for corporations' like oil and gas companies that do not need them. it eliminates the carried interest rule that allows

private equity investors or managers to pay for lower tax rate on their income than firefighters and teachers and everyone in this room. thereby, create a corporate tax code that allows businesses to be more competitive, globally. it incentivizes manufacturing in the u.s. it takes away the incentive for companies to relocate overseas and reverses that and creates incentives for companies to in source in the u.s. he is very supportive of this proposal and hopes that congress will see in this an opportunity to prove the critics wrong. to show that we can get things done this year for the american people. >> picking up on the discussion

of gas prices from yesterday. is it fair for the american public to blame the president and his administration when gas prices start going up? >> i think this president as i said yesterday, fully appreciates the impact of higher gas prices on average americans trying to make ends meet. he talked about yesterday in the event where he discussed the extension of the payroll tax cuts. one of the reason that cutting the payroll tax for 160 million americans is it gives the family an extra $40 per paycheck, a $1000 per year to pay for things like gasoline. to fill up their tanks. he is very aware of the impact that it has and fully understand

the anxiety it creates. he understood that when he was running for president back in 2008 when there was a spike in the price of oil. there has since then, as you know last year and again this year, this is a recurrent problem. it is a problem that was identified back in the past and we need a comprehensive energy plan. one that insist that we can safely and responsibly expand our domestic oil and gas production, which he has every year since he has been president. we have increased oil and gas production. every year since he has been president, we of decrease our reliance on foreign oil in prius -- imports. every year, he has made a focus of the importance of investing in alternative energy technology. that combination is the one that

will build a foundation for energy security in the future so that we are not as vulnerable to the kinds of price shocks we get one oil climbs, as is now. as i said yesterday, we need to do the things we can control. to insulate ourselves from the things that we cannot. that includes oil prices that are going up, in spite of the fact that oil production is going up. the prices are going up in spite of the fact that the president has made clear -- put in place policies to ethics ban that the amount of exploration in the gulf of mexico. will expand the amount of exploration in alaska. we hear that -- will expand natural gas production in the u.s. unrest in the middle east is

beyond our control. other factors like the growth of the emerging countries such as china and india. in that kind of environment, we need to do everything we can hear at home to insulate ourselves from these price shocks. that is what the president has been doing. >> does he accept responsibility for the fact that prices are going up? especially -- >> e tester sensibility -- he accepts responsibility the need to develop a comprehensive energy policy that protect americans in the long run from these kinds of situations. it makes america more secure. that is the policy he proposed. i think that if you are suggesting that there is a responsibility for price hikes in global oil id is not because

of anything he has not done to expand -- it is not anything he has done to expand american gas and oil production. he will continue to do that. he will do that as he takes action to, for example as i mentioned yesterday allow for the first nuclear reactor to be built in 30 years. this will increase our investment in alternative energy, like biodiesel and solar. he is and all of the above -- he has and all of the above approach. you will hear more of that from him. >> rick santorum says the reason these things are going up is because this president's dedication is erratic when it comes to environmental factors. >> id is incumbent upon those who report on random statements by politicians seeking office to compare them to the facts.

the facts are as i have stated. oil and gas production in the u.s. has risen every year since the president has been in office. oil production is now higher than it has been in eight years. this president is taking action to ensure that it continues to go up. i think it is important to mention and i do not know where various candidates are on this issue, but the president, last year, through an agreement with major automobile manufacturers had put into effect enhance fuel efficiency standards that will save american family is $1.7 trillion at the pump and cut oil consumption by 12 billion barrels. yesterday i said 12 million. the fact is, that action alone did more to enhance our long- term energy independence than almost anything any president could do.

>> in a briefing on the tax proposal, secretary geithner said that they are using the proposal to move the process along. this can take time. it is designed so the corporate tax can be done with individual taxes, which will come after the presidential election. given that, what is your time frame for really getting this done? >> i would simply agree with secretary geithner that this is an opportunity to do it alone or singularly, just the corporate tax reform. the president has put forward a framework that explains his report should -- his approach to the corporate tax form. -- reform. we need to take action now. there is a reason congress could not take this on. if congress were to of feel

bullish about the possibility of bipartisan cooperation, they could take up individual tax reform. the president's principles on individual tax reform are clear. it is absolutely the case that you can do this by itself or you can do it with individual tax reform. we would welcome action by congress in accordance with the president's principles in either case. >> what does the president wants to do to encourage the congress to fill bullish? >> secretary geithner has 30 spoken with leaders in congress about this. -- has already spoken with leaders in congress about this. i'm sure the president will be having these discussions. if there were interest in pursuing this corporate tax reform plan by republicans and democrats in congress, the president is very interested in doing that. it echoes -- that applies to individual tax reform.

as secretary geithner said, he has begun this conversation on the hill. we hope that continues and we can produce a result for the american people and for businesses that will create a result of the lower tax rate for american businesses and that will make them more competitive. a broader base to ensure that this reform does not get a dime to the deficit. and, a situation where the american manufacturing sector and the advanced manufacturing sector is further incentivize to grow. if we are small businesses -- where small businesses have an environment that is easier to deal with taxes by simplifying the tax code. allowing them to expanded up to $1 million. there are a variety of other measures that would make american business is much more

competitive. >> have you gotten feedback from the ceos about the plans? >> i do not have anything to share with you. we believe that the reception has been positive and will be positive because it does what so many people say is important to do. this is democrats and republicans. this is low or the rates broaden the base, eliminate the underbrush of unnecessary subsidies and loopholes and special provisions that complicate the tax code and basically have the taxpayers subsidizing oil and gas companies, for example which enjoyed record profits last year and certainly seem to be on track to enjoy significant profits this year. they do not need those subsidies. that money can then be used to pay for an action that would lower the rates for everybody. >> the white house keeps

praising these journalists who were killed in syria. how does that square with the fact that this administration has been so aggressively trying to stop aggressive journalism in the u.s. by using the espionage act to take a whistle blowers to court? the obama administration -- that have only been used three times in history prior to the obama administration. there was a senior cia officer providing information in 2009 is a breach of providing information -- there was a senior cia officer providing information in 2009 about torture. >> i would hesitate to speak to any particular case. for obvious reasons. i would refer you to the department of justice for more

on that. i think that we absolutely honor and praise the bravery of reporters who are placing themselves in extremely dangerous situations in order to bring a story of oppression and retell -- brutality to the world. and i think that is commendable. it certainly is worth noting by us. as somebody who knew both of the victims, i particularly appreciate what they did to bring that story to the american people. as for other cases again without addressing any specific case, i think that there are issues here that involves a highly sensitive classified information and i think that you know, the vaulting that kind of information is a serious issue. it always has been.

>> the chips come out here. >> that is not all i am saying. you know is not. you are making a judgment about a broader array of cases and i cannot address those specifically. >> the government groups are making them, as well. >> not one that i am going to make. >> i want to ask about what the president's case is to deal with this. when you go back to 2008, the president mocked senator mccain in this whole drill here, drill now. that was modest. it was a dumb idea. now, you are holding it up as a good idea. how do you square that? >> there is a distinction you are missing. the president's approach has been to responsibly increase domestic oil and gas production. what he has never said and what i attempted, i thought, to mock yesterday was the idea that there are magic solutions that

you can put forward a proposal to cut the price at the pump in half, on a piece of paper with some magic beans. that is not realistic. all oil and gas production has been increasing and even as it has been increasing, the price of oil has been going up. that tells you there are factors that are not entirely within our control. putting forward to the american people that simply by drilling more, you are going to resolve this problem for the long term is not being honest with the american people. that is why you need a comprehensive energy strategy and in all of the above approach. that is why you need to invest in clean energy technology as well as open the millions of acres of -- millet -- open up land in new mexico to allow for the building and permitting of the first nuclear reactor in this country in 30 years. you need to do it all. that is the only approach that

is responsible. to suggest that there is some other way that you can wave a magic wand and cut oil prices is simply not treating the american people with respect. >> in 2008, -- >> then and now, the president believes that there is not -- that drilling along -- alone was the way to resolve problems. production has increased every year he has an office. and yet, oil prices -- we experienced by similar prices. i think that tells you that the way to insulate ourselves from these kinds of price shocks is to increase our energy independence. to reduce our reliance on

foreign oil and to increase our capacity for energy production as well as traditional fossil fuel production in the u.s. that approach is not drilling alone. it will not solve the problem. it was true in 2008 and it is true now. >> he talked about a comprehensive plan. at the end of last year when white house officials were talking about the 2012 agenda, i t was suggested that the only legislation that you must pass was the payroll tax cut extension. how can you now say that dealing with an energy plan is something the president really wants to do? >> in december, we were not talking about that. he has been talking about this since he was sworn into office. the point about extending the payroll tax cut was the fact that congress, which had not agree to of interest,

republican -- bipartisan cooperation on difficult issues the one issue that we felt confident was a must-do piece for both of us was extending the payroll tax cut. we fully hope and expect that congress will do more than that. we look forward to congress taking action on the president's refinance proposal. that would put more money in the pockets of the homeowners. taking action on an infrastructure investment bill that could put hundreds of thousands of construction workers back to work and allow for the building of -- rebuilding our infrastructure. and taking action to, if they felt emboldened by this bipartisan potential of putting teachers to work.

taking action on the other portions of the jobs bill as well as measures that would enhance our energy security. the point is is that the sky's the limit here if congress is willing to work with this administration. if democrats and republicans can work together on the hill. >> they give. i would like to know if you know of any educational initiatives the president has in place? >> the president has pursued a comprehensive education reform, race to the top has been one of the unheralded and bipartisan success is that this president has put forward. working with the secretary of education, he has also extended access to pell grants to allow for more americans to attend college. he will push forward with broad

education initiatives. you may remember, i know folks in this room do, at the state of the union in 2011, he talked about the need for the u.s. to out-educate the competition globally. we can mount win the -- we cannot win economically if we do not have the best educated work force. that is our competitive advantage. even though -- one of the reasons why we have seen a trend towards in sourcing, american companies bring jobs back to the u.s., is when they look at all the factors that go into deciding where to locate a factory or a business, or other companies may have lower labor prices, but we have skilled educated workers that can bring great value to american businesses as well as international. we have to keep that up. he is committed to education. >> you're talking about the

friends of syria meeting. part of the goal is making the opposition more fun to know, is the word you used. what do you mean and how could we do that? >> we will work with friends of the area -- friends of syria to help stand them up to cement its organizational capacity, its unity. so that there is an entity in place as this transition occurs. as we said in the past, it is not a question of if, but when. when assad gives up the reins of power in syria. we will do that working with the friends of syria and this broad coalition of members who are committed to the syrian people. we will strongly condemn the

brutality of the assad regime. >> some are calling for the recognition of the transitional government in syria. will you support that? >> i do not want to get ahead of the process. helping to organize and unify the opposition is something we are doing in cooperation with our international partners. this is an entity that is emerging as the brutality of the assad regime continues. i do not have a timeframe on is for when something like that what happened. right now, we are working with the friends of syria to help them organize and unified. >> could you clarify remarks made yesterday by the state department. if pressure on assad does not work, are we considering the army? >> our position is that it is not appropriate now to

contribute to the militarization of syria. what i said and i think what was said in the state department was simply to make clear that we do not rule out additional measures that the international community waits too long and does not act decisively. i am not hinting at imminent action or change. our position is that is not appropriate to contribute to the militarization of syria. there is opportunity still for this process to result in the departure from power of assad and a democratic position to take place. >> there are hundreds of civilians that were killed yesterday. why would we intervene on behalf of the rebels in libya and not help those in syria? >> that is an excellent question. i have attempted to answer that earlier. u.s. vested more directly.

-- you have asked it more directly. this demonstrates why he is important to not have a one- size-fits-all approach. this situation can be different even though the broader unrest in the area is similar or rough -- reflects an overall trend in the area. in libya, as you recall, there was broad support from the u.n. the libyans want to direct military intervention. most importantly, there was the opportunity, identified by the president and other leaders of nato to have for dramatic impact of preventing a message here in benghazi. there was a city coming under assault by gaddafi forces. the situation in syria is

different. again, we are not ruling future actions out. right now, we believe the right approach is not to contribute to the militarization and to pursue a path of pressuring assad and isolating him to further along the process that will lead to him stepping down or no longer being in power. >> can we support establishing a safe haven? >> again, we do not believe that military action is the right course. militarization is not the right path right now. we are, through humanitarian assistance come up pursuing international efforts to assist -- 3 humanitarian assistance, we

are pursuing help. in terms of militarization to secure the country that is on a policy we are pursuing. >> as you know the in iae inspector said they felt their trip was unacceptable -- if unsuccessful. what is the white house's reaction? >> well we regret the failure of iran to reach an agreement this week with the iaea that would permit the agency to investigate the serious allegations raised in its november report. it is important to note that the iaea maintains regular access to both of iran's facilities. they were seeking additional access. that is what the visit was about. in line with their safeguards obligations.

they were suspected of what is asian activities. this is another demonstration of iran's refusal to abide by regulations. we will continue to evaluate working with our p5 +1 powers. we will look at the letter in response to lady ashton's letter about talks. this action suggests they have not changed their behavior when it comes to abiding by their international obligations. >> on the tax reform plan, mitt romney is giving his own economic speech today in which he is going to talk about his tax reform plan. he was initially going to give that on friday and he moved it up. was the timing of today's announcements meant to preempt

that speech? >> what we have been saying for some time now is that corporate tax reform proposal would be put forth at the end of the month but, within the timeframe of the submission of the budget. we have kept to that schedule. no perhaps others are timing their announcement around hours. this is something secretary geithner has been working on with the economic team and treasury team for quite some time and we identified this time as a time to release a number of weeks ago. >> tonight is the 20th republican presidential debate, potentially the last. given that, will the president watched tonight? i know you say he has not in the past. >> why is tonight so different than any other? [laughter]

i did not ask him this morning if he planned on watching. i suspect knowing him, and knowing his viewing habits, he will not. he has a family at home. he tends to the family -- when he watches tv, he tends to watch sports or a movie. i do not suspect he will, but he keeps up with what is in the news. he will be aware of the general you know, back and forth in the debate come tomorrow morning. >> do believe he will face off with one of these candidates? is it important for him to see the debate and not just read about it? >> i think there is ample time between now and early november for him to prepare for what will be debates with his

opponent. once that upon and emerges from this process, you know, -- we are not pushing up against that deadline. he will be prepared when that time comes. he might look at a little tape when that time comes. right now, i think he will continue his practice of finding something better to do. >> injust to clarify what you said earlier. syria is different from libya. and if there was an imminent massacre in syria, would you be considering a -- >> there are ways to speculate about individual things, conditions that might be in place. what was the case of libya is that all of those conditions were in place to create an opportunity where international outside military action to

prevent the slaughter of civilians to enforce a no-fly zone was an option. the international community could take that option. my point in making that comparison is that it was that set of circumstances that made that option achievable. that is the one the president pursued it with many international partners. including countries from the area. making the distinction -- it is easy to say that you did this in that country, why do you not do it in this? >> none of those things are -- >> we are not getting a u.n. security council resolution passed. there is a different military situation on the ground. different circumstances, in general. >> also, to follow up on the question of tax reform. he said that the president's principles on individual tax reforms are clear.

it does he want to lower rates there? >> his principles are clear. they are the buffett rule, as you know. you have not heard me talk about it. >> that is not tax reform? >> certainly it is. it is insuring that millionaires and billionaires do not pay lower tax rate than average working americans. he has made clear that he -- his approach to tax reform ensures that those making under $250,000 will not see their taxes go up. he is committed to the expiration of the high end to push tax cuts. so, you know, the set of principles he has put in place in terms of individual tax code s, can be translated into individual tax reform. he has spoken at length about the individual tax code.

he has put forward a framework for corporate tax reform. obviously, this is the kind of thing when people ask me about executive actions. this is the kind of thing that the president cannot do on his own. he needs congressional cooperation and he looks forward to its. >> you just listed the president's views on certain tax policies. what people say tax reform they mean broaden the base and lowering rates. that is not what you are talking about. >> well, i am not sure i agree with your premise that tax reform solves that -- follows the formula. >> -- >> that is a formula that applies to the president's approach to cat -- to tax reform. the approach the president has taken on individual tax rates is that we should not have a tax code that is skewed to benefit through the carried interest rule or other itemized

deductions that allow for millionaires and billionaires to pay lower tax rate than average americans. he does not believe that folks earning up to $250,000 should see their taxes go up. he does believe that those making more than $250,000 should see their taxes go up. the unaffordable bush tax cuts need to expire. >> even those principles, does he believe in broadening the base and lowering rates in general, keeping all of that aside -- >> this principle is reflected in his embrace of the buffett rule and expiring the bush tax cuts at the end of the year. >> the president --

>> let me get some other questions. we have put forward proposals that included limiting itemized deductions for high-income americans. that is a way of broadening the base. eliminating carried interest is a way of broadening the base. hedge fund managers who are earning income do not pay a capital gains rate, they pay in income tax rate. the president put forward, both on paper and three speech is quite a bit of information about his approach to individual texas. >> are you comfortable with the idea that what you are closing certain corporate loopholes your proposal gets winners and losers in the sense that there are new advantages for manufacturers and clean energy makers? >> we are comfortable with an approach that eliminates a huge

amount of the complications loopholes, special provisions, subsidies from the tax code. it focuses the tax code on growing the american manufacturing sector. growing the advanced manufacturing sector. and assisting small businesses which are, after all important to economic growth and hugely important to job growth in this country. yes. we believe that we need to eliminate a lot of the existing complexities from the tax code. then, we need to identify very clearly what our priorities are when it comes to manufacturing advanced manufacturing, small- business is. >> -- small businesses. >> kept saying that we need to insulate ourselves against higher gas prices. yet, you have explained how domestic production is at a high

level and it is doing very little to insulate us. if we do continue to pursue obama's all of the above policies and accomplish the things that the president is seeking, will that be enough to counter what is happening in the world or markets? willie lower gas prices? >> what this president -- will it to lower gas prices? >> what this president is pursuing is something that will reduce dependence on foreign sources of energy. by definition, that will create a situation where we have greater energy security in the future than we have had in the past. i cannot predict what oil prices will be in a your two years or even six months. i would be careful of anyone who says they can. what we can do through policy

is increase our domestic production of oil and gas. increase our overall domestic sources of energy including alternative energy. thereby, insulating ourselves from some of the stocks coming in the future. what we know, for example, is if through the enhanced fuel- efficient standard said the president put into place is we will see $12 billion of oil because of -- 12 -- 12 billion barrels of oil. thank you. 12 billion barrels of oil. that is a heck of a lot of oil. we know that we would be paying for that oil at some of these standards. we would be paying for a certain portion of that -- we would be paying for and providers for a certain portion of that. these are steps we can take to insulate ourselves from energy

shocks in the future. you are shaking your head, but it is absolutely logical. unless we rely on foreign oil the less dependence we have, -- the less we rely on foreign oil, less dependence we have. >> does that just go on to the world market with all of the rest? >> the more that we increase domestic oil and gas production understanding that increasing domestic oil and gas production alone will not solve our energy challenges, i too will mean we can continue to reduce -- it will mean we can int -- it will mean we can reduce our reliance on foreign oil. when you have problems in the areas of the world that produce oil, you are -- the effect on your own production -- the reduction in your dependents insulates you from that shocked >> will our gas prices -- >> i am not going to predict that.

>> took a question yesterday about secretary vilsack's comments about getting the oil companies to help insure that the recovery that we are now seeing is not jeopardized by energy costs. what did you find out? >> i would refer you to the department of agriculture. i think what our approach has been is to come through the policies i have been describing several times, to work with domestic oil and gas companies to ensure that millions of acres are available for exploration in the gulf and in alaska and in other places. we work with manufacturers in a variety of ways to insure the smooth operation of a system that provides oil and gas

products to american consumers. i do not think we have done anything more specific than that -- i do not know anything more specific than that. this was more about the fact that we have a lot of dialogue to ensure that the overall system that produces supplies is operating smoothly. >> in a speech tomorrow, is he going to specifically address the current price situation? is there going to be reassurance for people in this speech which is going to focus on energy? what's he will talk about the need to take in all of the above -- >> will talk about the need to take all of the above approach. he will talk about the energy security and our economic security in the 21st century. i expect he will make reference to the rise in oil prices that we are experiencing right now

and the anxiety that that creates and the impact that has on american families trying to make ends meet. he has been very clear about his concern about higher gas prices and higher oil prices and what that means for families. he has been explicit about that and of the arguments for the payroll tax cut. i expect you can hear him talk about that tomorrow. >> the president is singing. [laughter] it is a reaction? >> i think it is a hidden talent that we are just getting to hear. it is not at all -- the circumstances at the apollo

theater and last night at the event here were pretty unique. i cannot predict the next time. it may be at the inauguration next year. [laughter] what i can tell you is -- [laughter] it will be a celebration. amongst his many talents is the ability to carry a tune. >> karaoke? [laughter] >> polls are suggesting african- americans a -- average americans believe that corporations do not pay their fair share. why does the president make more of a show of this? why does he not a bang the drum is a little bit when it could be politically positive for him? >> i think the president has been pretty explicit about his firm belief that there are provisions within the tax code

that allow some corporations to be subsidized in ways that are just not affordable and are unnecessary. i think oil and gas companies are primary example and one that he has been beating the drum on for some time. that is included within the proposal. he has not often been criticized for not speaking out on this issue because he has spoken out on it so clearly. he will continue to do so. we have been clear about the carried interest rule and why that is bad tax policy. why did these to be eliminated. it is not equitable is a hedge fund manager or a private equity executive pay tax on his or her income and a rate of 15% when average people are paying more. that is not affordable. we need to be fiscally responsible in our approach to the tax code. that is approach the president

is taking in this corporate tax reform. it is the porch that guides his vision on -- it is the approach said that his vision on taxes. >> there was a letter sent asking the president to release oil from reserves? is that on the table? >> i have not seen the letter. i will answer that as i have in the past. i have no specific comments to make on that possibility. we obviously examine every issue when it comes to higher oil and gas prices. that was the case last year. it continues to be the case. we take no possible response of the table, but i have no specific comment to make on that. >> are you looking at it? >> i have no comment. >> on the buffett rule, governor christie remarked that warren buffett should shut up and write a check. [laughter]

>> i think mr. buffett, who is widely regarded for his success in business, as well as in philanthropy has been quite outspoken on what he believes is an issue of tax fairness. he simply believes, as one of the wealthiest men in the world, he should not be paying effective tax rate lower than his secretary. i do not know why. i do not know why the governor thinks that is a bad idea. but, the president believes is the right approach. >> he needs to write the check and tell that is the possibility? >> that is a clip -- quip that tries to draw attention away from a serious issue, which is the need to have a tax code that

is fair and that helps the american people as they recover from this recession. it helps us achieve the kind of balanced approach that -- to deficit and debt reduction that this president has pursued it for some time now. quips aside, the buffett rule is an important principle to apply to individual tax reform. >> rhetorically, when you are talking about the energy policy -- when we are talking about tax reform, it seems like what is going on is there are more things we can do on individual reform. is that congress -- why is it not the same comprehensive ground of strategy? >> -- ground up strategy? >> the corporate remark that was

laid out today is detailed. if we could achieve some of these important policy objectives through executive action as the president did with close to a dozen automobile manufacturers in putting in place feel efficiency standards that will save 12 billion barrels of oil, we would. in order to achieve tax reform or balance deficit and debt reduction, we need to work with congress. we need a framework that makes clear what the president's principles are and the path he believes we need to take in reforming our tax code. the secretary of the treasury invites' democrats and republicans together to lower their rate, expand of beit -- expand the base, and reduce loopholes and create incentives for american manufacturing and small businesses to grow. >> the president made a

statement about observation of ash wednesday. is he doing thing in particular during land -- lent? >> i do not believe we have information. we did say something about ash wednesday. thank you very much. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2012] >> looking at primetime tonight on the c-span network, here on c-span, a discussion from the world economic forum of the role of women in government and business. cheryl sandberg -- sheryl san

gerber dissipates. this begins at 7 eastern -- 7:00 eastern with author david unger on c-span2. this weekend on c-span, live coverage of the national government association meeting here in washington starting at 10:00 a.m. eastern on saturday. this is what governor heineman and governor -- the governor of delaware. at 11:00, the discussion of growing state economies. at 3:00, efforts to encourage entrepreneurship in states. all this weekend on c-span. at the 1968 olympic games, john carlos raised his fist in the black power salute. >> this is black power. intimidated some many people by using that phrase. but power. when they use a -- black power. when they use that phrase, many people think that black power of

destruction. blowing up the statue of liberty. ground zero. destroying america. there was nothing about destroying america. i t was about rebuilding america and having in america that has a new paradigm in terms of how we can be with each and everyone of us. we made that pledge in america about the land of belfrey, the home of the brave. -- land of belfrey, the home of the brave. we want to take our time to evaluate and then take our initiative to fix it. >> discover more about african- american history during black history month on "book tv" on c- span2 and online. the associated press reported

today. activists say more than 60 people have been killed across syria as president assad's prejean continues. scholars recently said that the international community to community does not have many good options in syria. -- the international community does not have any good options in syria. a host of countries will gather in geneva on friday with the goal of finding a way to end the violence -- indonesiain tunisia with the goal of finding a way to end the violence. >> we are here today to talk about the syrian uprising, which has been at the center of the policy community, the academic committee, and the regional politics for the last few months. it has posted problems to all of us as we have watched a peaceful

uprising turned into something quite brutal and had to stand by as an international community trying to figure out his -- how to respond to the bloodbath. in order to discuss this difficult problem, from the inside from this year in perspective, not from washington's perspective, i brought together three of the leading scholars of syrian politics. they will give us an insight into the dynamics of syria's uprising, where it came from, where it may be going and how the regime is responding. we will speak in the order that you see my colleagues and friends down the table. our first speaker is the director of the middle east this program at george mason university. bassam haddad is the founder of a journal. he is the co-founder of an

excellent online journal. he has written a number of important contributions on syria, including the new book " business networks, the political economy of authoritarian resilience." he recently published an interesting essay called "the idiots guide to fighting dictatorship while posing military intervention." [laughter] our next speaker will be in salwa ismail a professor at the university of london. she has written two of the best books about political islam in egypt. particularly in cairo. she has spent a great deal of time living and working in syria. she was in syria from november 2010 until the end of may of this year. she had some firsthand experiences with the evolution

of the protests in damascus. she has a new article out called "siri's uprising -- syria's uprising." she has more coming out in the months to come. finally, stephen heydemann. he previously directed and taught at columbia university. he is the author of the book "authoritarianism in syria at." kias recently the author of a policy brief from the brooklyn institutions -- kias recently the author of a policy brief from the brooklyn institution. this is the best short resource and understanding are regimes have responded to challenges which they faced from below. i have asked each of the speaker to speak for 10 minutes. -- each of the speakers to speak

for 10 minutes. i will then ask questions and we will have dialogue for a while. i might have a few remarks. i usually do. then we open it up to questions from the audience. for now, the floor is yours bassam. can you come to the podium? it is easier for the camera. >> thank you for coming. thank you for putting this together into inviting us to this discussion. i am hoping that the best part will be actually the discussion afterwards. the question and answer. it is impossible for me to say anything that i would like to say in 10 minutes. it is a very short time. what i will be doing is touching on the fourth things that i have prepared to discuss.

starting with the caveat that we on the uprisings are complex. however, syrian uprisings have been particularly complex. especially because it plays a pivotal role in various historical struggles in the middle east. it is at the heart of a lot of the intersecting conflicts. this explains to a large extent the protective nature of the syrian uprising and the undesirable nature of nearly all trade-offs that one can come up with today. we are no longer looking at what is a better outcome or solution than the other. we are looking at what is less horrible. we are doing so -- if we are not doing so, i think we will be in a fair amount of disillusionment as to what is going on inside

syria and around syria. eyes will pose questions and try to answer them -- i will pose questions and try to answer them. what explains this year in uprising in terms of the structural effect -- the syrian uprising in terms of a structural defect? what explains the resilience of the regime? where are we going? i will start byi will start with the structural defects of the uprising. i will not talk about all the causes. i will focus on one element that is usually diluted by of all politics and a major stakes than most people have in this complex. this is basically the question or the answer is the issue of what i call dual polarization which i have researched in the book just published. we have in syria historically

over the past 25 years at least economic change or reform process these led by the regime and its partners which is a select group of private sector mobile spirit we have a process of change that has created two a kind of polarization. it treats a polarization between the haves and have-nots in other words is a polarized society between rich and poor, to the extent that it is unprecedented in the history of syria after the 1950's. is a polarized society in regional terms between the countryside and the ruaral areas. this is a development that has

been in effect since 1986. we have to cut the polarization's that hit the countryside the hardest, and a way that produced a situation that is literally becoming unbearable in the early 2000's. after that you had a drought that was offalso severe in the countryside starting in 2003, moving for several years after that, which caused at least the migration from the countryside to the cityies of the least 1.2 million people. the numbers can be trusted always, according to new finds. most of these smaller cities and towns that absorbed or tried to absorb this migration has a lot of trouble doing so, including cities like homs and also on the

coast. damascus had a higher standard of living in terms of families able to absorb the migration and terms that they were able to hold up more. after that, the fact of the iraqi attacks came after 2003 and boosted damascus in terms of real estate and trying to cause problems later on at the end of the decade. we have the situation where the countryside was ready to explode. it is no wonder why the uprising is strongest in the countryside started in the countryside and is most intense for reasons that have to do with the level of discontent reached at that time drop the 2000's, but certainly in 2010. now, what i would like to move to is from this basic

understanding of what is key to understanding the uprising, i would like to move to the question of the resilience of the regime. let me say first that there is -- this is by no means a complex set -- a comprehensive account of the causes, but without understanding of this structural cause it is difficult to understand what is transpiring at its base nature and so on. what is causing the resilience of the regime? if you would like a brief response be on a lot of the politics of this situation, we should look at the two levels, the regime and society where from the opposition must come. at the level of the pershing, we have observed over and over that the syrian origin historically and today is far more organic

and cohesive and coherent than a lot of the regimes in the region. that does not mean -- certainly has the street where it is difficult to separate the parts of the regime in syria as you would be able to in egypt. in egypt you have a modicum of autonomy for the army for other parts of the rushing, and this can be debated to the extent in terms of the extent of the autonomy of these institutions of that at regime to exist. it is difficult to try to distinguish between these institutions which make it difficult for a solution in egypt, and tunisia's solution where the head of state departed pushed by our present

course pushed by the apparatus of the military. in syria, this was impossible because the regime is considered one and the same with the institution and it is difficult to imagine a scenario with the army and the security services or the republican guard or what have you would come and say to the head of state that as a result of what is happening and to avoid further escalation and to preserve the regime the head of state must leave. this scenario is not possible because of the organic nature of the regime. before i go to the society, this issue of organic leadership -- organic regime structure makes it difficult to come to compromise and create a zero sum game between the state and society. in society, we have -- a very brief -- we have a remarkable

homogeneity. syria it is a country of minorities and a large majority. if you do the math, demographic which is not always the most productive thing if you do the math you find a lot more balanced than one would think. you talk to people and find that 10% of people are rolling over everyone, the picture is more complex, and it is not evidence in policies to wrap. we did not have something that is like the apartheid in the south african states. there are a lot more nuanced issues in sieyria and

minorities have developed an interest in the status quo of a regime. they are not regime lovers. they note that they might be served better under a minority regime. after that the question of sunni urban merchants and other groups supportive of the regime because they have benefited. you get a picture that is more balanced. the homogeneity of the society is making for problems in terms of the opposition. but it's a much in terms of inside syria. the opposition has been able to focus on the main issues, where as the opposition outside has been very divisive and going to disintegrate in time. i cannot talk any more because

-- >> >> i will give you another three minutes. >> ok, thank you. between the coherence at the top and homogeneity at the bottom one have an important structural cause. the stalemates we observe is certainly structurally accorded to this kind of opposition between the coherence of the regime and homogeneity of society, and the problems of collective action, but also be have a strategic set of variables that explained the statements -- the stalemate today. there shame from the beginning -- the regime has not gained significant power.

first of all the regime in many ways by the week has been losing ground in terms of its control of various territories, because of strategic regions. it may pull out of certain territories to maximize its effect in territories where it sees conflicts arising. a needs to suppress the opposition. the regime is actually constrained by the ability to rely on the most loyal forces it deploys to crush the opposition. the higher up you go in the apparatus of syria, the more of the regime is likely to resign -- to rely on its offices. it must be careful in terms of deployment of resources and troops. the regime is losing ground

but if you look at the question of power and break it down, the physical material to mention and the nonmaterial to magic the physical material one, it is holding up although under going problems come up at the level of equipment and maintenance. this is not something we can completely observed, but less important. what is more important is the nonmaterial dimension of power which is the question of authority. shane is no longer able to govern the entire territory -- the regime is no longer able to cover the entire territory of syria. a lot of people are missing the point in terms of this question of being able to govern. once you are not able to govern, you must govern by force in ways that are much more brutal than in the past 40 years where what is considered

authoritarian must exact compliance. you have more deterioration to date where the authority of the regime is making things happen. the ability to make things happen has been severely compromised. that is part of its weakness, which is taking everything but the week, no matter what things people may say that, the regime is holding on. what's it gains powerr -- opposition is gaining power in various ways, in terms of people fighting, coordination between people, and gaining in

power, the more the regime is killing protesters. this is where it is in this place where it must respond and its response is producing more deaths in an opposition that is becoming more trained. i agree this is taking place. it is exaggerated but the critics. most of the opposition is locally are fighting a regime that has led the population for more than four decades. that is basically what is causing a stalemate. my last point is where is the uprising going and i have said this several times before, and that is we are now witnessing the transformation of the syrian revolution or uprising from a legitimate fight against

a dictatorship to an occasion for a regional and international attempt to restructure our operations in the region. we have a situation where this is not simply about syria anymore, and this makes it difficult for people who wish to fight the dictatorship that has existed for decades, but also are not keen on bringing an alternative that can be called replacing a local dictatorship in syria with a regional dictatorship run by saudi arabia which has always pushed for authoritarian regimes that control their populations and and this has happened in bahrain. we should also look at the other side and not think of it as a

humanitarian effort only. thank you. >> i am pleased to be here, thank you very much. i wanted to speak up from where -- or some of the issues raised by bassam. this is a comparative study for a more comprehensive presentation i am giving next month, and i am looking at both cairo and damascus. i will look at the damascus part and set up what i am trying

to do here. i want to deal with a number of questions that emerge with reference to the geography of the uprising. the one set of arguments put forward, the uprising is a su nni protest and it is a protest of a peripheral uprising taking place at, and this is also put forward by bassam, which i would differ with to some extent. again i would differ with that. it seems to me there is much emphasis on the sectarian dimension it is presented as the sunni uprising, and i would disagree with that and say that on the surface it appears if you look into other dynamics, if we

focus on the urban settings, we see by virtue of patterns of movement of population movement the rural-urban migration, there is a question why is the fastest quiet? it is not quiet at all. there are three types of urban areas where we see protests and mobilization in damascus. one, in traditional quarters, and looking there historical kurdish quarter. we also find a great engagement with the uprising on the part of what is called settlements on the edge of the city particularly the quarters in the north.

these are on the northern gate of damascus. these have been in the forefront of the uprising. if you go to facebook pages, you will see great mobilization, people in the hundred thousand's going out every single day students after their school going out to demonstrations, evening demonstrations. also the street army is providing some protection in some of these areas. the third area it is what is referred to as whorl damascus, which is on the edge of damascus as well as further down in what is known as other areas. these are the ruling hinterland of damascus, and much of it is

urbanize. it has seen great movement. damascus now has 20% of its original inhabitants. we can differ on numbers, but 50% of these places offer to avert -- 25% -- and this has played an important variable, the fact that part of the explanation why we see movements, people know each other, and that has made it easier for them to mobilize. it goes the same for another area. we're talking about classes who have banned against the rushing but that is not against the regime come out but for economic reasons. when we see who is opposed to the rushing in the cities, i

picked two quarters in damascus, and these are -- these are peripheral communities had been brought in or set up urban establishments, that are predominantly alouite and they settled there. they were settled their and if we talk about an issue on the land that belongs to people, said there has been conflict that has not been sectarian. what you're looking at is what are you saying -- this has to

do with the regime functions. it functions on the basis of reliance on the military. because they have been favored or other economic reasons many of the villages had to be abandoned because there was no economic development. the only avenue for them was to be part of the ranks. they were set in the areas by a shark us that. no integration into the current account id. -- into the urban economy. unlike many of the alawites that have come to the states. they get recruited to crest the

demonstrators. these are divisions in the urban settings that can be read as a caring but we should look at them as sociopolitical and economic. there are no sunnis and alawite who hate each other because of economics. if you talk to the population at large, you would find out this is not a religious matter. this is a sociopolitical and economic matters. i want to say my own reading others shame, the regime is functioning on the basis of violence. it did that for 40 years. it's a mechanism has been a massacre and debt detention centers. it has done that against the entire population. this has been reasons for the oppression of protests, but also for uprising. this is a continuation of that.

what can we say about the other areas where b.c. mobilization -- where we see mobilization? many have moved there. we're talking about work shop owners if employed in workshops that have up to three people to our economy producing for the large merchants. a long process of exclusion. we can say that if we're talking in economic terms on the upper strata of society that supports the regime. there has been an ongoing differentiation in merchant classes, and lower ranks of the merchants. these have been excluded for a

long time and we are seeing the disengagement from the regime. we are also seeing that urban quarters that have been marginalized and have engaged in the economy as opposed to the regime. i want to conclude because i do not want to go to a lot of details, arguments that this is a sunni uprising. we need to look at the social forces engaged and these on the whole are not religious. we need to look at the machine because there is not much difference between the regime

and the state by virtue of the fact the regime controls so much of the apparatus of the state. there's not a separation of any institutions and it does that through the security services and the army as we are seeing today. what we need to look at our sociopolitical processes that have been working for a long time and we are now seeing them as working and we have populations in minorities that are being used as buffers against the other parts of the population that are engaging in protests. this does not mean there are no alawites involved.

many of them are alawites. see the minority is -- minorities fearful for what could happen, and that is because the rushing has presented itself as the guardians as the minorities against sunnis. i will end by mentioning this, one of my contacts is organizing demonstrations reference to his neighbors who were told at the beginning of the uprising they were told you are going to lose your homes and your land because your neighbors will come and claim it back. what happened is many of residents came thinking they were defending their homes against extremist sunnis.

the regime has mobilized the people to move against each other, saying that your life and your welfare depends on our continuity. the last example is with -- which has been established in the 1970's, and they feel they owe their presence in the city to the president. they by saying life is good, we thank the president. that is not just a cliche. it a sense is it gratitude -- is a sense of gratitude that is a gift of violence. they were brought into coercion and used as buffers against populations, and and some of the young people are drawn out to

surprise -- to suppress the uprising is. the last point i am making, one of my interviews said they are exploited. they live in misery like us. they defend the regime, which they have nothing in common. they fear for their life. thank you. [applause] >> thank you. my thanks to marc and to gw for sponsoring this. i have to say i think if you were interested in having two of the really smart and most insightful analysis to help understand the dynamics of the syrian uprising you really just heard them today. i am going to move us in a completely different direction.

in the division of labor that we established for this panel, i decided, or it was mutually agreed that i would hold down when i would call the policy wond and of the spectrum, which is something of a departure for me. but i decided i would focus on u.s. policy responses to the syrian uprising, focusing on where we are now and where we might be a candidate. and i think as pressing as it might be as a starting point it is the case that the only reasonable way to frame a discussion of u.s. policy in response to the syrian pricing is to acknowledge that the u.s., along with many of the other governments that support the process of political transition in syria, find themselves today in an exceptionally difficult position.

they are really struggling, all of them, to find a way forward with no clear sense of what that pathway might be. this meeting of the friends of syria group that will begin later this week in tunis is i think a reflection of both the challenges confronting the united states and its allies in thinking about what the next kind of frameworks' might be for sustaining diplomatic and economic pressure on syria at a moment in which the u.n. pathway seems to be close, but we have no real guarantee or no real in fact detailed information about how or whether the friends of syria group might be able to play that role. what i would like to what i would like to do is to outline three reasons why the u.s. confronts the sort of policy dilemma in terms of how

the u.s. state department gauges and responses to the uprising. i will spend time on each and make sure that we can come in under 10 and said that we can all jump in and the next phase of the conversation. the administration has really pumped up against the limits of their efforts to use political and economic pressure to bring about a change of regime in damascus. based on developments of the past several weeks including the russian and chinese veto of an effort to secure the u.n. resolution targeting the regime of bashar al-assad, they now find themselves confronting what i think we really have to conclude is the fairly decisive failure of u.s. strategy towards syria.

this reliance on traditional methods of statecraft, economic sanctions. it's one aimed first and foremost which is to increase the cost of loyalty to the regime to peel away critical constituencies from the assad regime including the business community, including various minorities, and to cause sufficient strains and tensions within the coalition including the military leadership of the regime and the security service leadership of the regime to cause the assad regime itself either to fracture or to set some sort of process of negotiation weather isn't by the arab league framework or

otherwise order to persuade someone surrounding the regime that the conditions were in place and would justify an internal coup of some kind. this was the underlying logic of u.s. strategy, raise the will to with this cascade of consequences leading to the end of the regime. here we are a year after that policy began to be put in place with virtually no evidence to suggest that it is working. we know that the regime is frayed. we know that there are internal tensions within the regime. we know that the economy is taking a significant toll on the economic sanctions. the kind of cleavages that might cause reporters -- supporters and minorities to defect have not occurred. this has to be recognized as a failure of it -- as a failure.

this is anchored in a misreading of the resilience of this regime and the foundations it could drop in order to sustain itself in the face of the external pressure. moreover, this is the second reason that we find ourselves in a troubling moment for u.s. policy, the administration, together with his partners, seem to feel that they have no viable alternatives to the strategy that they have developed almost right from the beginning of this uprising. it is true that the russian and chinese veto at the u.n. and the escalation of violence we have seen in syria over the past couple of weeks with horrific attacks other centers of resistance have reached new

light. i expect this debate to continue but i don't expect this to affect the strategic calculus of the obama administration because i think underneath this rhetoric underneath this debate, the administration understands very very well that none of the conditions that would be needed to make intervention a meaningful option are in place. i will not go in through the detail of those conditions but i think that there is a fundamental understanding that without the appropriate context defined in terms of those conditions is for all intents and purposes faoff the table. where does this leave the regime?

beforethis leaves the administration argued that the same kind of pressures that have failed to produce the effect on the assad regime and the strategy that we should stick with into the foreseeable future. this, i'm afraid to say, is not the position that i think any administration would like itself to be an. the obama administration finds itself in the position of arguing that our best course is simply more of the same even though conditions on the ground are not waiting for a slow- moving u.s. policy in to affect the strategic calculus of the

assad regime. the rate at which the regime is willing to apply oppression outpaces the rate at which our policy has an impact, then we are kind of in the position of arguing that we will lose money on every sale but we will make it up in volume. this is not the position you want to be an. this is not just a strong foundation on which to argue. this gets us to the third and final reason why the administration is struggling in focusing so much of its energy on the political track. we would like to focus on the

fact that intervention would be a mistake. it would be unfair to deal with the most troubling trends defining syrian uprising over the past six months and that is the militarization of the uprising and the proliferation of a growing number of very thin the organized and thinly coordinated armed opposition actors all over the country nominally grouped under the free syrian army but in fact operating with very little command. it has continued to insist that militarization is a danger. the peaceful protest offer the best hope for political change. what that means is that as militarization deepens and expands for obvious reasons given what we have seen, the

cost of not having some kind of strategy in place before more effectively managing militarization and for building a political approach that includes deeper multilateral engagement with the opposition are around the program to equip to change, to increase the capacity of the armed resistance and to do so in a fashion that would bring them more essentially under the authority of the civilian wing of the civilian opposition, the cost to us of not having a scattered policy tools in place become much much higher. i will conclude by saying that if we recognize the aim of u.s. policy is not simply a regime change we are engage in this not simply because we want a political change but because we want to support a transition process that holds up some

promise of putting syria on a trajectory that will lead it with whatever difficulties and challenges we know it is likely to face towards a stable and even one with a democratic outcome in the future. it does seem to me that we have some obligation to assist in efforts that might prevent the growth of an uncontrolled armed opposition with uncertain and potentially very dangerous consequences for syria's future. we need to consider much more actively, the administration needs to consider how it can broaden u.s. strategy beyond its current focus on diplomatic efforts alone and neglect militarization as a phenomenon that it must respond to.

there's a possibility 0 unchecked militarization that we see on the ground in syria today. thank you. [applause] >> i would like to think our guests for some interesting and stimulating contributions. i will pose a couple of questions to the panel as a whole and with the individual speakers. steve mentioned in the options of diplomatic strategies. it was carefully planted remarks. they are offering a political path forward called pressure, not war. you can get it our website.

i don't know if it answers the questions that were raised. i agree with a great deal of the analysis. some of us are trying to find those alternatives. for the panel the questions i wanted to raise were about some of the different regions of what the syrian and are is and what it might become. the detailed description of some of the ways in which we see the evolution over a long time. this is not a creature so -- of the so-called arab spring but has deep roots. we need to recognize the long- term realities of the violent nature of the syrian regime. this is very important for

understanding the much deeper roots of these problems in syria and then simply in response to the fall of hosni mubarak and people using facebook. these are deeply rooted conflicts that will not find in easy solution any time soon. they would want to see a stable syria to not become a for text for instability and conflict over the next decade. it will become whether bashar al-assad stays or goes if we continue towards the current path towards military station -- militarization. what we're trying to accomplish is to create some kind of

reasonably stable and legitimate syrian political order after bashar al-assad, then we really need to think about some of the different readings we have heard from this panel. i would very much like to hear about the dialogue which they began on this question of sectarianism. they hinted at a different reading of the implications of the rule and prayerful readings. we have made a very persuasive case for the roots. this is a conversation which i have been involved with now for too many cases for me to bear to remember. i dealt with it during the

bosnian campaign, in the rock. we are dealing with it again. at some point people are slaughtering each other based on their identities. at what point does an artificial divide become a real one? can it be prevented once the guns come out. once begun, it seems to be almost irreversible. when you see in bosnia, 17 years after the end of the killing and you still see no movement towards reconciliation or normalization. the second big question is the

implications of this not only for the uprising, the syrian opposition. there are many fragmented different groups activated on the ground and challenging the assad regime. many of them are highly local. they seek the protection of things that go under the banner of a free syrian army, no one is under any illusions that they represent a hierarchical opposition. there is a great attractive -- a great attraction to the idea that we can avoid the false choice. we would like to find those people to support.

when you're trying to formulate policy, you actually have to support someone who isn't. there is a unified point of contact, no organ is highest military hierarchy within the free syrian army. -- no organized military hierarchy within the free syrian army. who does the international community help? this is a question that i would oppose even more directly to see them. we're using this as a punching bag in washington. we must not do this until they have unified and to a more cohesive authoritative and legitimate umbrella.

not only are they not that things come on they will not become that thing any time soon. they still want to arm at the free syrian opposition. you cannot host these unless you have a national government. clearly what they describe as necessary was not necessary. go ahead and armed the free syrian army. is any prospect in the timeframe that we're talking about in which army and the free syrian army will make any difference? the last big question, and then i will let the actual speakers

speak. the real question is this, as this process extends, whether or not we arm the free syrian army let's assume that the violence spread. i see the current regime supporters willing to take a gamble on the transition. one article of faith with much of the community which was is to support the syrian opposition. this might trigger defections by giving them confidence that assad was going to fall and this would give them a license they

need to make that enormously risky leap. we would like them to go out and murdered their sectarian opponents or not, they would be less likely to make these into the unknown. in your reading of this, are we heading towards a situation where the kind of traditional transition becomes more or less likely. those of the questions. do get two minutes each.

>> i'm going to address a couple of things. this will be better suited to address the points. the points on the uprising, what are they? in syria and the rest of the region, to make a long story short, it is certainly the explosive combination. this is a function of the explosive combination of sustained military rule and basically are the new liberal

policies with crony capitalism which has produced devastating divides within society and at the same time, this has unraveled the public sector in many ways or the state welfare services in many ways that in the past decade with drew a lot of the subsidies and supports that many relied on to supplement their income. the supplemental economy gradually eroded the support of many who relied on the supports and it it kind of crated this fertile ground. i still believe that the syrian uprising would not have started had there not been some sort of domino effect elsewhere. the kids who wrote about the

overthrow of the regime would have been tortured. this has been happening for decades. we have to really recognize that as much as you would like to put the focus on the authoritarianism, this is not produce revolution. this is not produce mass protests. there are a number of factors including the reduction of the conflict that is ready for mass mobilizations. i think that syria was not as right as we have seeing -- as we have seen.

there is a reason why the other arab states have not actually gone that way. you have to tilt the fact not that they don't have a return is a but they have not reached the level of discontent which would make them fighting bullets with their bare body is a rational thing. considering that i agree with you, i am wondering if we misunderstood each other. i don't think the sectarian situation the there is part of the problem sectarianism is worse. i would really love to hear from people in the audience, especially people who are from syria.

i think sectarianism is worse when overlaps with with local power. when that takes place, whether manufactured i think it becomes explosive to. whatever divisions which might have existed they have been exacerbated and turned into divisiveness. policy does actually exacerbate the business within the society. different groups can come together easily and be at each

other's throats. there is the problematic perception, especially here in washington that it is different in the middle east. there is something more intimate about sectarian divide. the majority of books that have been produced on the region. i do not think that it is a sectarian situation. however, when you create divisions based on sec for the purpose of creating mechanisms of loyalty, the regime by narrowing the circle of leadership at the type -- at the top or if you use this to assess your power you are going to

increase sectarianism. when you massacre people by the tens of thousands that happen to be from the other sex -- to the other sect, you are going to put a stamp that is difficult to remove. the number of christians in syria and other minorities that support not necessarily the regime but the status quo which can be conflated with the regime sometimes and sometimes they do supported the regime, actually. my family is completely split on the question of the regime and the uprising. yes, it does play a role but the role is very much a function of policies and the overlap between these variables. let's not forget that before the 1950's, minorities were

themselves excluded in the countryside not because there was questions and some sunni but because they were not part of the urban sunni community. unless we pay attention to these, we will revert back to this when it comes back to these issues. it does not mean that there is no sectarianism in the end. what is it that we should we should talk about the opposition because they will probably add to something that i said. there will be more information that is probably organic. what is it that we should be supporting? i really feel that it is important on asking his questions, especially as americans or people representing the american state or talking as if we are one. what we should be doing is a question that is very difficult and problematic and sometimes

depending on who is asking and where they are standing, it is hypocritical to ask. when our state officials say what we should be doing, are you serious? what if we should be doing is to stop supporting military dictatorships and dictatorships in the region where the past four or five decades. this is not a puzzle. we are supporting the most vicious and misogynist authoritarian regimes in the world including saudi arabia and many others in the region. we are supporting the apartheid state of israel. what is this talk about what we should be doing? we should first of supporting the dictatorship. we should stop crushing revolutions against

dictatorships. is this somewhere else? no, we did have these situations and we did crushed the revolutions. we're not interested in revolutions or democracy we are so, i think the question is disingenuous. the syrian people are right now being massacred and i think it will fare much better by anything other in the region, especially if led by the united states of america. i will leave my questions to my colleagues. [applause] >> i just want to say a few words about opposition to the regime. @ think we should also keep in mind opposition has been going on for long, long time.

it is not only just that we have had massacres and the islamic insurgencies' of the 1970's and 1980's. the figure is 100,000 political prisoners for the last 40 years. if we take that into account this is a country or population that has been resisting for the last 40 years. you would not end up with such figures, even if we could dispute or whatever -- we have thousands and thousands, and even after the massacres, we still found the communist labor front that was completely picked up by the mid 1980 -- by the mid-1980's.

the whole lot of them. many of them were alawites. that continues in the 1998's. many of them were syrian. every former so-called western- educated or whatever. you know they give a speech, they say they are going to do things differently. then went and organized the forums and started talking about how they could democratize. within one year, they were in prison. so, we see this pattern being continued. the problem is with the opposition which as a student in 2004 and 2005, i was with this movement in syria, and there's a problem which is endemic, i think. should we depend on the outside? or will we be able to do on our own?

in 2005, foreign interventions were going to take place. there was the unresolved assassination and so 1. there were even joked about that. is american intervention to unseat bashar al-assad. and also, a continuous talk of conspiracies. do you want an army coup or -- i remember in 2005, bashar al- assad -- but anyway, one man was got none of the way. we have the opposition continually being suppressed. we do not have the mass movement that we have now. that meet speak to young organizers who are with us. they thought in february, this

was their chance. if they do not jump on it now it was never going to happen again. i remember having this conversation. "you are not ready. you do not have the tenures of infrastructure. you do not have egypt." -- you do not have the 10 years of infrastructure. you do not have egypt." they said, they would take their chances. one of the merchants, young merchants was classified a policeman, and then 1600 people protested and so 1. that gives a sense that maybe -- i mean, any outsider, a sense of what the syrian regime was capable of. today, however, the same people who told me this would be like

libya are saying, "we did not think it would be that bad." [laughter] ok yes, yes, we are from libya but not imaginable. ok. and one anecdote was this merchants told me just before leaving there were closing the market on monday. i asked what he was closing. he said it, on his deathbed, he called and said if anything happens, you have again. -- you have it again. they took a chance, and this is what we are seeing now. we are seeing violence, the response to violence. it is not just the syrian army. think what is happening to the

so-called watchers. the collaborators with the regime. it is tapping -- is happening in the urban corridors. collaborators are getting liquidated. they are getting liquidated everywhere. we are going to see more of that. there is no sectarianism. it definitely can not be functional lyes. you know, -- it cannot be functionalized. you know, they go through various channels, and that is what we are hearing. there are all these reasons we should be concerned about the increased violence. i am not really sure what can be done about it. i would agree with them. i do not think the question is -- any way for someone like myself -- i am not ready to give advice to any administration

about what to do. formed the question to the american administration and other powers acting in the region, what would they do if we had a similar uprising in saudi arabia? >> [unintelligible] [applause] >> the saudi response this morning to uprisings in the eastern province was they would crush it with an iron fist. so, there you go. >> this is a bit of a digression. about the rain -- bahrain with the u.s. engagement in the crushing of the bahraini uprising, there is room for debate. we do not have time to have it your. i would say that decision was taken was quite extraordinary

reluctance by american diplomats who were not at all pleased with the pressure they were subjected to by saudi arabia, who identified bahrain as a red line toward the u.s. not to cross. we can get into that later. on the opposition and so one three key questions you post. is it -- three key questions you posed. is a viable counterpart? do we need to wait for the army to try to provide arms or even some other form of support, and what is the impact of militarization on the political dynamics of the syrian uprising, and if militarization spreads, is it likely to change the future calculus of some of these communities that have the essential support of the regime? i think we read over and over

again in the media, and we see ample evidence on facebook and other locations, of the depth and intensity of the conflicts within the opposition. i think we have to be very careful reading that. i think we have to be very careful not to exaggerate the extent to which increasingly corporate structures and the organization and mobilization of opposition activities and protests in syria are in fact taking hold, are in fact consolidating, are in fact beginning to cut your for it -- to cohere for the management and governance of the uprising. there are some out liar groups related to older previous -- outlier groups related to older, previous attempts to bring the group together. we have the national coordinating committee which is

taken on more accommodationist stance toward the regime of. we have the local coordinating committees which are organized through -- i do not know -- but there is a kind of effort to forge a more democratic framework for government of the local coordinating committees around assyria. and within the syrian national council itself. i think we saw evidence in the first assembly in late december 2011 to acknowledge or respond to some of the concerns about representation and the conclusions that had hindered the consolidation in previous months. no one would claim they act with -- without an enormous amount of mistakes and stumbling

along the way. i think this notion of disarray and incoherent has to be in some respects properly framed. i think we also have to recognize there is a bit of a catch-22 the opposition has confronted in trying to respond to and overcome its own organizational capacity limits. for many smart reasons, the u.s., the eu, the arab governments to some extent have held back or did hold back in the early time when the opposition was emerging. at a time when it was critical to provide the space for an organic, authentic syrian opposition to emerge and consolidate, one that would not be laboring under the shadow that it was nothing more than an instrument of the west, serving a western or foreign agenda, and therefore illegitimate as representatives of the syrian people. so, for example, within the

state department, there was a great deal of concern about any effort to reach out to the opposition because of perceived consequences delegitimizing the opposition if it became known the u.s. were engaged. and yet, what that created was a context in which the opposition, whose origins we need to understand -- that is the second time i have done that. of context in which any sort of political culture any sort of political society had been brutally suppressed for 50 years. and the the gas brought had been very -- diaspora had been very heavily apolitical. now the capacity for mobilization and the struggle to challenge the regime and define an alternative future with a very little on which to draw to assist in their efforts to do that. unlike in libya egypt, other

cases in which arab uprisings unfolded. the syrian opposition is at large and amateur opposition. they are cutting their teeth in the process of building itself as a viable organization without very much support or assistance from the u.s. or from other governments. so you know to the extent that we now look at the opposition groupings -- and we identified shortcomings that raise questions in our minds about whether it is right to engage them as a counterpart, my own view is we need to recognize, i think, that there are opportunities and possibilities for the international community to engage in support the syrian opposition in ways that might

actually help it to develop into the kind of counterpart that we hope it would become. i think it is a much more complicated question. again, i think if we are to have any meaningful discussion about strategies they would say they must be done in a fashion which insures the responsibility and oversight of the free syrian army. the notion that we would contribute to the creation of an armed opposition which has the capacity to stand as a viable challenger to the political wing of the syrian opposition strikes me as counterproductive. i will wrap up their. -- rapid up there. [applause] >> everyone spoke far longer than we were supposed to -- so,

yes, we do not have a lot of time. i would like to take questions from the floor, and then i would give everyone a last word. why don't we start here? keep them really breathe, because we are really -- >> [unintelligible] i have a question for steve. it is about the confidence -- have you read the confidence? even though the tunisian government's did not go to the syrian government? >> thank you. >> thank you. the question -- a couple of or actually all of the panelists spoke about the saudi and a

little bit about iran. let's put them together. i would like to entertain the idea that there's a lot of regional and mention and there's a certain aspect of the iranian- saudi conflict, that the iranians are trying to maintain that and the saudis are trying to come to the road with the iranians and separate their influence between iraq and iran. especially the iranians lost bahrain, and there is not much they can do about the iraqi government. and thank you for a great presentation. >> certification? >> -- sir? >> i have a question on the resolution in the u.n., if we can get back to that for a minute. the reaction to that that i have

heard, and this is based on popular press rather than academic press, is that russia has personal ties and they are more concerned about that than the syrian people, and nobody can explain why the chinese during the russians' veto. it seems to me that the chinese and russian vote typically go against what they consider internal matters, because they are afraid of something being used on them. i wonder if you can comment on that? >> [unintelligible] >> absolutely. we are going to stop the questions. last, final word. then we will wrap up at 2:00. >> i will end on this as well. in terms of the two new jets conference -- tunisia

conference, it is largely an agenda-setting meeting with one principal item on the agenda, and that is to organize rise -- organize a division of labor for a political transition in syria about which the government's will take which roles in an engagement with the syrian opposition. i think this is a framework that has as one of its principal aims to anoint the syrian opposition as a framework through which the broader aims of governments seeking a broader change will achieve their objectives, and that will shift from several weeks ago, when i think it felt international institutions would provide the board to pursue those efforts. there are differences in the sense of the government about

opprobrious strategies for engaging the opposition -- about appropriate strategies for engaging the opposition. saudi arabia and qatar are equally reluctant to provide weapons to the opposition. perhaps we will see an architecture put in place through which the french group will organize its engagement with the syrian opposition -- thefriends -- the friends group will organize an engagement with the syrian opposition. i would look good that as our role to come out of this meeting. if it does not, there will be a question about the efficacy of pursuing regime change in syria. in terms of russia criticizing -- >> [unintelligible] >> ok, we will set aside the russian question.

in terms of the u.n., chinese russian motivations, there is a longstanding strategic partnership between russia and syria but i think was important in their decision to be a. that is far less important in the chinese case. in the chinese case, the chinese actually expressed support for the arab league resolution this weekend, and they told the friends group that they would support the resolution date voted against in the security council only a few weeks ago. why? that had very little to do with syria. it had great deal to do with principals of global governance and the maintenance of international order in which the chinese are determined to prevent the west from monopolizing the international institutions that serve oversight of global governance. if you read this article -- i forget where it came now -- came

out -- are chinese spokesman who make the case that there are underlying principles about principles of global governance and they are not permitting the west to define the international agenda. that is why they were able to backtrack so easily a immediately following that vote. and i will leave it to that. i want to thank you for your time and attention. thank you very, very much. >> [unintelligible] [laughter] >> i mean, ok -- which questions are we addressing? all of them? [laughter] >> whichever you want. >> ok, iran -- let's bring in iran, let's bring in all the players. it is not iran because the issue

is that there is an expectation or an interpretation that makes this about syria and about dictatorship and the opposition, which is the case, which is true, but they make it only about this. at least what i have been trying to say, it is not just about the dictatorship and the opposition. i have been writing against the dictatorship and the syrian regime for many, many years. i wrote against the iraqi regime for many years, including when we were supporting the iraqi regime. the point is, the question of syria, pretending this is just about syria -- it is about syria, but it is also about achieving some sort of new domination or hegemony or whatever.

they are not the object. the object of the attack is a particular form of rule, at the state or regional level, and that is actually what is being hidden, not being discussed. there are various camps in the region now. in one camp, which can be called the resistance cap, which is manifested by these three actors, and a lot of people support resistance in the region. again, at arab countries domination, as well as israel, do not necessarily support the syrian regime or the iranian regime or even hezbollah in all of its dimensions. it is very important for us to not take this at face value, as i shared, but to support the

status quo in syria and tried to serve -- opposed the opposition because there are larger states making the trade-off extremely horrible. in other words, i would like to stress that most of the people in the region would not support the syrian regime and also do not support what is now being worked up regionally and internationally to move this process to some sort of completion especially involving international military intervention. i think you said -- i am not opposed to militarizing the opposition. i am opposed to international military intervention in syria. as far as russia, i do not think russia supports the assad family. when you look at the syrian regime, the russians will have

no solid partner in the region. they will actually have no leverage on various issues including conflicts in the region and other matters. i think these issues, the structural issues play a bigger role. about the u.n., and the opposition, and the resolution, i have very few good things to said. i actually support the other branch of the opposition, which is kind of led by the national coordinating bodies that firmly opposed the regime, but also financial military intervention. they are the people on the ground. i am not just holding this position -- >> final word? >> well i think to speak about demilitarization without thinking that any militarization

-- to speak about the militarization without thinking that any militarization -- there will be american saudi, and so on. and iranian and hezbollah intervention. and i think we are seeing the beginning of that. there is all this talk about hezbollah's engagements. i have not seen anything to confirm that. however, i think the leaders of the resistance have really been damaging for the opposition. i am not really -- i do not know what is the way out of this. i think we should always keep in mind there are people getting killed everyday.

and to think that civilians are thinking about, imaginative play, keeping civilians saved by peaceful means. doing business with the military actually having the military economy internationally and globally, and that is what's confuses -- and that is what confuses machines in the middle east and elsewhere. i think the problem is much more global. to think it will be solved by militarization -- it is not. it just means further doubt continued, unfortunately problems in the region. >> i would like to thank all of you for staying around. thank you to our panelists for a fascinating discussion. i would like to draw your attention to events we have on the evening of march 25 when

our guest will be here to discuss her new book "of violence, non-violence." thank you for coming. have a great day. [applause] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2012] >> tonight on c-span, from this year's world economic forum in davos, a discussion on roles for women, including archbishop desmond tutu and cheryl sandbur. >> as a man becomes more successful he is better liked.

as a woman becomes more successful, she is less like. from childhood to marriage, adolescence, we reward men every step of the way for being leaders, for being competitive taking risks. and we teach women -- laid-back, be communal. until we change that at the personal level, we cannot change this. we really have to get out there and say, there is an ambition gap. we need our girls to be as ambitious as our boys. we need our boys to be ambitious to contribute in the home. we need our girls to be ambitious to achieve in the work force. >> watched the entire discussion tonight at 8 eastern. -- 8:00 eastern. later, leaders from the international monetary fund talk about the economic outlook for this year. plus the ceo's from several

major corporations talk about their role in the global recovery. >> this weekend on c-span, live coverage of the national governors' association meeting on saturday. at 11:00 saturday, a on growing state economies. at 3:00 p.m., a look at efforts to encourage entrepreneurship in the state. live in genga coverage this weekend. >> lcv means local content vehicle. the purpose is to collect programming from outside of washington, d.c. how do we do it? we staff each one of these with one person with a small video camera and a lap top editor so they are able to roll record, and produce editing is from the road.

why and what reason why do we want to do this? to get outside of washington, d.c. we will descend on each city. one will do history program at historic site. another will be doing the tv programming at bookstores. we work with our cable partners with each one of these cities. all of this not only goes on the air, but it's archived on our web site. we are also doing extensive social media. you will see us on facebook and four square which is location based. it will be on twitter as well. it is a chance to be on air and online to social media as well. that is why we want to do this come to get out of washington, d.c., go to places where we do

not do programming. we want to get out of the beltway. >> watch the local content vehicle in shreveport, louisiana in the first week of march. >> a spokesman for the international security assistance force in afghanistan said today that the burning of the karan by u.s. military personnel was a mistake and completely unintentional. it has sparked protests across afghanistan, leading several wounded and at least one dead. this is about 1 hour 7 minutes. >> good morning, ladies and gentlemen. sorry for the slight delay. we will adjust a little bit. we're pleased to have major- general hook with us this morning. we will let you know that the

tail end of his briefing, we also have the iisaf spokesperson to give us a briefing. major general david holt is joining us again in the briefing room. he was last with us on the eighth of december. at that time, we had some technical difficulties. we will keep our fingers crossed. gerald kokerhook has held his position since october of last year. from october 2008 to october 2009, he was deputy commander regional command south. following his opening remarks we will take your questions. with that, sir i do not want to delay it any further. over to you.

>> thank you. good morning ladies and gentlemen. thank you for attending today. as you just heard, let's hope we did not have the same problems we had on december 8th. the connectivity drop out. i would like to cover a few points on the afghanistan integration program. we're emphasizing some of the key points i made on december 8th. then i will open it up to the floor for questions. this is a peace program that has been designed, implemented lead, and executed by the afghans. this makes this program very powerful in afghanistan and is one of its main strengths. the program was implemented at the local level, but directed and coordinated at a national level. so the crucial work of negotiating and reaching out to insurgents, taking them through

the demobilization program, and finally reach integrating them into their communities is carried out at the -- and finally reintegrating them into their communities is carried out at the local level. it is to peacefully and permanently leave the battlefield and rejoin their communities with their dignity and honor intact. it is not a surrender program. nor is it an amnesty program for criminal behavior. any counterinsurgency strategy includes a non-military solution that reaches out to insurgents with the goal of peaceful reintegration where everyone benefits. this program ambitiously seeks to do this and to deliver peace at the very local level. the cornerstone of this local approach is the resolution of

grievances that led people to fight or become insurgents in the first place. it is expected that the overwhelming majority of those fighting in the south and other areas are fighting for non- ideological reasons. it becomes clear that addressing their grievances can draw them back into society. the whole aim is to build trust and confidence amongst people who have been fighting the government and each other for far too long. therefore, an afghan-led peace program supported byisaf and the united states -- the united nations is central to success. it is worth remembering that this program is relatively new and has been running since 2010. to date, nearly 3100 former insurgents have formally enrolled into the program. let me again dispel a few minutes.

insurgents are not paid to stop fighting. reentry is provided as a provisional allows of $120 per month for three months. that is enough to meet the basic sustenance needs of their families while they undertake disengagement training. previous programs sought to pay insurgents to stop fighting and that failed. reintegrees are not immune from prosecution. it is decided on a case-by-case basis by afghanistan. aprp does not allow a compromise on human rights, particularly women's rights. they must renounce violence, cut links to terrorist

organizations, accept the constitution and respect the rights of minority groups. reintegration is an essential element in the comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign implemented by general allan. unrelenting pressure on the insurgents have given them two choices, be killed or captured. reintegration now gives them a third choice. peacefully leave the battlefield with honor and dignity intact and rejoin society as a productive member of their communities. it fits right in to general allen's campaign. i mentioned on december 8th that we saw four conditions that has given aprp momentum. first, there is a deleterious effect on the capability of insurgency on the battlefield.

physically mentally, and psychologically, the surge has impacted on insurgents, some of whom when they come and say they have become tired of fighting and are exhausted with the fight. secondly international conferences such as istanbul and others clearly demonstrate international and internal political support for aprp. in november, we brought together 203,000 afghans across the country who work for peace and reintegration and took that message back to their communities. the third element is the increased capacity of the program itself. the original afghan goal was to have the program framework established and operational in eight provinces with a thousand

reintegrees by 2011. today, as i said, over 3000 have come into the program significantly exceeding what was considered challenging expectations at the start of the program. there are still issues to be addressed, but the afghans are fixing issues as they arrive. make no mistake. the program is working. the final component is the winter affect on fighting in afghanistan. many fighters are dislocated from their leaders who have left afghanistan for the winter. looking at the insurgent leadership, fighting in the relative safety of pakistan make others do their fighting. afghan leadership in this program is essential. backed up with agile and responsive isaf support.

taking these conditions and integrating it to further momentum. thank you. i will take any questions. >> thank you, general kohook. >> your predecessor, philip jones, briefed us in may of last year. you said it would take between 10,000 to 12,000 insurgents entering the it reintegration program to make an impact on the war. do you accept that assessment? if you do, how do you judge the impact of 3000 100,000, as you said -- 3100 as you said?

>> you drive a number of issues. let me take them in order that you ask the question. first of all i do not see the number quite in the way that you articulated it. for me, the key is getting the key individuals off of the battlefield. it is about focusing on those individuals that are perhaps the mid-to-low level leaders that are driving the insurgency. while the numbers are important it is actually about the effect of taking key individuals off the battlefield. the second element that you asked about, it is fair to say that the qatar talks have created a great deal of confusion in the insurgency. if you and i were fighting in afghanistan, the wonder what is going on with their leadership. their leadership is looking to make a deal as they are involved

in some sort of -- it is not quite clear who is talking to who. but with the winter affected fighters removed from their leadership they're wondering if they are about to be sold down the river or if there is a deal being cut or they will be cut out of. >> cannot follow on that? if the pecan i follow on that? -- can i follow on that? it is difficult to interpret the 3100 number if you say that the numbers do not tell the whole story. >> we are tracking about 20% to 25% who have come in that are mid-to-low level leaders. it is important to recognize that what we do not tend to see

our individuals coming in. we see a leader of a group generally between 5 and 25 who decides to come in and he brings his fighters in with him. so those mid-level-to-low-level leaders bring the numbers in. that delivers the effect we want, which is the local leadership down at that level. i sometimes worry that there is too much of a fixation on the numbers. the fact is that they are bringing in people to deliver peace and those individuals going back to their local communities. once that occurs, you can see peace delivered at a very local level. the trick that we are trying to pull off is to understand the broader impact of those groups coming in. it is quite a difficult thing to measure. if i could put it in context i talked about the effects of the surge, the psychological effect

that there has been on the insurgency. those people have come in. that has had an impact in some areas on the nature of the fighting in those areas. but it is not necessarily just that that contributes to peace and a more peaceful state in the area where it occurs. what we're trying to understand is the relationship between the surge, the weather, and people who just want to give up fighting because they have had enough and those who are pre integrating -- are reintegrating. it is understanding a number of factors and seeing which is contributing to a safer area in the environment that it has occurred. >> thank you. >> what you're saying that the program you have now is working. but can you have this program

implemented or working fully without a fully functional pakistan. afghanistan and pakistan are meeting. on the other hand, pakistan is not fully with the u.s.. finally, u.s., nato, and afghanistan are fully engaged with this program. what is the future of this program without pakistan? >> that is a very good question. the way that i address that is my role in supporting general allan and supporting the afghans who deliver this program is reintegration takes place within the boundaries of afghanistan. it is not within my remit to lookouts out of afghanistan to other countries. i think you would acknowledge based on recent visits that have taken place in afghanistan and into pakistan by in multiple

american politicians in particular, that they have made it clear that there needs to be efforts put in to this on both sides of the border. but in my particular role, i focus on those people who are fighting within the boundaries of afghanistan. the key for me here is -- while the point about pakistan is important -- 80% to 90% of the people who fight in the insurgency never leave afghanistan. if i could achieve a perfect outcome and get those 90% of the insurgency to reintegrate then the 10% that lives outside of afghanistan would become much less important in terms of the campaign. as far as i am concerned focusing on those were fighting within the country, if i can get them to come in and reintegrate, it effectively deflates the effect of this -- the effectiveness of the insurgency and makes this a more peaceful place.

>> what do you see now as the mood of the afghan people as far as the government is concerned. in the past, they were not with president karzai. do you think they have more confidence in the government of afghanistan, especially with president karzai? >> i tend to focus on what afghans think about the peace and reintegration program. and all the polling we have taken in the last 12 months suggest that there has been an increasing acceptance by the afghan population for reintegration to occur. so i'm heartened by the fact that a great percent of the afghan population what reintegration to work and make a more peaceful afghanistan. that is the area that i focus on, trying to explain and help the afghan government explain to

the afghan people why this program is important. that message seems to be working. if we go back to my opening remarks, i mentioned that the traditional surge that happened in november, the afghans who came together from across the whole country, they came away with a very solid understanding of what the program is trying to deliver. and they also went back and sold the message across afghanistan that peace and reintegration was a way to deliver a safer and better afghanistan for everybody. >> to questions -- #one, you said these are legitimate insurgents or heart officials. there has been trouble in the past in identifying these people. what is the screening process that makes you know that these are legitimate fighters?

let's go with that one. >> when people are in negotiations to join the program and they make an intention to reintegrate, which is the start of the process there is a very comprehensive vetting process that takes place. some of this criticism of vetting happened early in the program before the details were worked out. the government uses this process to assure itself that the people they are collecting into the program are action bonafide insurgents. when an individual comes in, he fills out a series of vetting forms at the provincial level with the provincial secretariat.

wednesday are done with that, they are reviewed by the provincial governor, the peace committee, and more. when those are bonafide insurgents, the process then moves up to cobkabul where the same national moi the ministry of interior, the joint secretariat that runs the local level, and the high peace council -- they all check as well. the reason they're in big there are checks at both levels early in the program when the bidding process was not right, they were -- when the vetting process was not right, there were a lot of people allowed into the process. hello people have been revetted.

very early in the program 231 reintegrees came in before the vetting process was established. they have all now been revetted. some have been identified as not bonafide insurgents. the key thing here is that, if the afghan demint decides who -- if the afghan government decides who enters the program this is a robust program that addresses the issues that you raised. >> in the past when some of these people came in to be reintegrated, some supposedly left because they were not getting jobs, were not accepted,

and had no way to support their families. so the returned to the fight. so do you have now a way to have long term stability in the community? >> you draw out a very important issue, which was a problem early in the program. it helps to put some of these problems in context before i addressed the question you raised. this program, when it was set up, it was designed, lead, and executed simultaneously. the concept was put in place before of the structures were built. that led to some of the problems early on. if we had been having these discussions six months or nine months ago, i would have been arguing or defending some of the failings in the system. i think most of those failings have now been washed out by the progress that has been made in the last 14 months.

now to your specific question, which is effectively about recidivism, let me talk about the individual firms when he comes in. when an individual comes in, he accepts three months of transitional assistance. in those three months, he does demobilization training and the $120 per month transition was calculated by the afghan government for a man to feed a family of six in kabul during the time that he was going through demobilization training. once you get to the end of demobilization you become a normal citizen of afghanistan. beyond that, there is no promise that you individually, will be rewarded. this is where you see the power of an afghan-designed system. the program focuses on the village that except the reintegree back. when he is going through the

process of demobilization, he asks his community for forgiveness as well as going through the vetting process. in 99% of the cases, the community access the individual back. the individual asked forgiveness and the committee says yes. so they accept ownership of that individual. the individual has been accepted back and is forgiven and is now responsible for his behavior to the community. when to get to the point where the individual has been through his three months of demobilization training, he is locked into his community by this honor code. where this program is extremely clever is, if the community accepts an individual back, the community benefits. there are tiers of gr popants. -- tiers of grants.

communities that except individuals that can ask for a grant to improve the community. when the individual who is reintegrated becomes part of the community and the community gets to the grant, the work that is provided, some of those individuals who work on that program, are actually reintegrees. 55% of the community -- with the community and the individual together in a way that makes recidivism extremely low. to date, we are actually tracking between five and seven recidivists and about another 20 to 25 that we think might be. we have asked them to investigate those. in a program like this, 30 people being recidivists at 3100 is an incredibly low number. it comes back to the design of

the program which is about locking the individual and the community theater and not rewarding the individual. -- the community together and not rewarding the individual. as soon>> general could you tell us a little bit more about your role in this process? what kind in a kind of support does isaf supportprovide for this? >> if i may, i will take those questions in reverse. one of the things that is very

powerful about this program is that is designed, lead, and implemented by the afghans. when we talk about transition, there will never be a requirement for this program to transition because it is currently own, design, and run by the afghans themselves. in my view, it gives it resilience and makes it much more likely hood to run on. as far as isaf support, we support on a number of levels. i hope the technical implementation of the program. i see him probably two or three times a week. we talk about the things that he is trying to do and where he needs isaf help. pfalz an example would be when we are doing -- an example would be when we're doing biometrics.

we can expedite the process. my dignity worse with the deputy minister of the program -- my deputy works with the deputy minister of the program. i have an operations branch that helps the operations branch of the joint secretariat. there's a grants grants that helps with the delivery of small grants. while the joint secretary is building its own capacity and i come back to how this is a young program -- we provide some extra capacity to help him come up with ideas. ultimately, those ideas are always at the behest of the afghans and the afghans themselves then take the work that we have done where we're helping them, afghanize what has happened and implemented in the

way that they want. >> prior to transitioning -- [inaudible] >> have you said what portion >> i don't tend to look at it, as i said earlier about the figures. i see it through a different mechanism. 3100 or the number of people that have formally enrolled in the program, but in many respects, the more important thing is taking away the grievances that these people are fighting for. one of the things that is clear but could we interviewed all of the people who reintegrate these people are fighting for non ideological reasons. they are fighting because of grievances. if you address the grievances you not only remove the

individual from the battlefield but to make it less likely that someone will generate behind you because of a grievance. there was a recent example where a provincial peace committee negotiated a solution to an intertribal dispute that had been running for 30 years and had taken over 150 lives. while that was not directly related to the insurgency, it delivered a more peaceful environment for negotiation and grievance resolution, which is why at the start i talked about grievance resolution being an important component of the program. >> do have an estimate of how many fighters there are out there? >> again, as i said, that is not a way that i look at this, at the challenge. if you think of the insurgency

as able to regenerate itself based on grievances, then just taking individuals of the battlefield without grievance resolution means you will not reduce the size of the insurgency. at that point brigance -- that is why a grievance revolution is part of general allan's approach to reintegration, which is about taking away the causes of the fight and delivering peace through a mechanism that does it not involve killing people. i am sure all of the academic experts will say you cannot kill your way to success in the counterinsurgency campaign. in aid and internal settlement and a desire for peace in and among the communities. delivering a desire for peace and taking away grievance means that the numbers become less important, but the peace effect becomes more pronounced. but how much have you reduced the size of the insurgency by this combination of people reintegrating and removing the

grievances themselves? >> let me give you an example of where this has worked extremely well. the problems with the most number of reintegrated is 800. when i was talking with the governor about 10 weeks ago, he said that before the reintegration program he was unable to travel more than 10-20 kilometers outside the provincial capital. we have reintegrated and having been successful, and having brought people in, he now feels comfortable driving around 80% of his province. the challenge for us is to deliver that same effect throughout afghanistan. we are looking at ways of getting those lessons be applied more broadly. it is not a question of numbers

although there have been a significant number of people who have come in. it is about taking a few blocks off the battlefield who have a grievance, and -- taking those people off the battlefield and peace occurring allow local level and then spreading people. >> can you explain what you meant by saying there are 20-25 people that you think might be recidivist? what does that mean, are they missing or have they potentially committed some crime? what exactly do you mean by that? and the five-seven recidivist that your tracking, what is the status of them? have they been arrested? >> let me start with those 5-7. those are people who have been

investigated and we know they have gone back into the insurgency. so we have clear evidence that they have gone back to the fight. the reason i say 20-25 is we have some localized reports that are being investigated. what we find is, when we examine the case of recidivists, there are some individuals have a grudge against them and then spread rumors that they have gone back. so we have 20-25, as i say, that are being investigated. we try through our own channels to understand where they are and what they are doing. it comes back to what happens at the end of the mobilization. -- at the end of demobilization. if you decide not to work in one of the programs that has been

established, we don't formally track those individuals because they are just normal citizens. that is why we are not 100% sure on the number. >> general, we are extremely grateful that you spent part of your evening here with us in the pentagon briefing room and grateful that you are able to do a repeat performance after the last time and are technical difficulties, so thank you for coming back. we would now like to transition to the general. i realize there will be a seat swap their in kabul. i will slowly read the introduction of our next briefer and we will get into that very shortly. again, thank you very much for joining us this evening. >> ok, and thank you very much at your end.

>> our second briefer this morning is the isaf spokesman of the german army. we have asked him to join us this morning to provide an operational update of the situation in afghanistan. we believe that was an important topic for you, beyond the topic that general hooker just discussed with us. he will obviously make introductory remarks with that of day, and then we will turn it over to questions for you. we will take this sort of pregnant profsause until we see the general come up on the screen, and then i will just do an introduction of him. we have canceled this morning

gaggle, so this will be your news event for the day. good evening, general. i have just read the pentagon press corps of our next debt as part of this briefing. as i said, the general is a german army general. prior to this assignment he was the chief of staff of the german army forces command. he has served in his current capacity as the eye staff -- isaf spokesman since june 2011. this is his first time to join us but we hope it will not be the last. we are grateful that on short notice your arrival to join us, and thanks to the folks there on the other end that may be seat swap so graceful and effective. over to you, sir.

[laughter] well, good morning to washington. just on the brink of -- it is good to be back with you because i was with you from 2001-2005. can you hear me loud and clear? >> loud and clear. >> i think we lost boys. -- i think we lost voice. good morning from kabul. as you already know, we had an unfortunate incident yesterday where personnel improperly disposed of some religious material which we believe included korans. as soon as we learned of this mistake, we stopped and

launched an investigation to discover why and how this happened. this incident was completely unintentional. material was inadvertently given to troops for burning. the decision to burn this material had nothing to do with it being religious in nature or related to islam. it was a mistake. was an error. today, and afghan delegation joined the investigation at bagram and because we want to be as thorough as possible in determining how that it is determine how best accident occurred. we are deeply concerned if religious materials were damaged in this incident, and we will get to the bottom of what actually happened. isaf as complete respect for islam and the reverence with which the koran is held. we will make certain that of someone failed to follow rules

they will be counseled. all coalition forces in afghanistan will complete training in the proper handling of religious materials. no later than march 3. the training will include debt indication of religious materials, their significance, correct handling, and storage. general allan and isaf again give sabir apologies for any offense this may have caused it to the president of afghanistan the government of the republic of got -- of afghanistan, and most importantly to the noble people of afghanistan. with that, i will now be ready for a few questions. >> you said the disposal had nothing to do with religion or islam, yet we were told that these books were taken out because they were extremist in nature.

so i am trying to understand how that have had no relation to islam or religion. and secondly, can you tell me if the detainees who are apparently passing messages to each other were actually writing in the korans themselves? is that why they specifically were set for disposal? >> i will start with the second part first. we have not got any proof of that yet. that is a vital part of the investigation that is ongoing. we want to make sure is as open as possible. that is why the material was handed to islamic authority straightaway after the incident occurred, and why and afghan delegation was taking part in the investigation that we had this afternoon. that is one of the questions

that had to be entered which basically comes down to live with this material selected? why was it selected to be destroyed? then given to soldiers who actually brought its to the burn bit of the detention facility. there it was brought to being burned, to be incinerated, and the local workers at the facility discovered what type of material it was. it was just material that was written, from the soldiers point, for destruction. the workers immediately interfered, pulled material out that was partly charred, and we have seen korans that were partly charred. who gave the orders, what was the chain, how did the material then go to the burn pit, and

what actually happened at the byrne bit? that is the investigation, and on that we will come out very shortly. >> was the entire library thrown out are just some selected material? dick or just some selected material? >> -- or it just some selected material? >> it was a considerable amount. i cannot say it was an entire package coming from one place or how it was collected. the material that was that the pit at the time was secured straightaway, partly by the workers who repair and partly it was quickly looked after by islamic authorities at the location. it is part of the investigation to actually look into where did the material come from a one location more locations what was the reason for the decision, was it used for any other

purposes what type of material was it? the thing that has moved up more than anything is that korans were among the material and also charged in the fire. this is what led to the unrest we have seen over the last 48 hours. >> i am not sure i understand what part of this was inadvertent. was inadvertently that these religious materials were taken out of the present? or was that a deliberate decision? or was it just inadvertent that there were given to the troops for disposal, or was it inadvertent that the troops then took them to the burn pit? >> the mistake i am talking about, and it is a great

mistake, and we are obviously all aware about the grave implications that this mistake has, in particular when it comes to mishandling korans was made somewhere down the line, and that is what has to be found out in the investigation. who basically failed to discover the quality of this material? who basically told soldiers to take it and to dispose of it in an improper way? it is part of the orders that left the headquarters yesterday by general allan in how to handle and store islamic material to increase the awareness, to know what is inside a library what is inside a facility, what is the type of the material to lead to the correct decision and to not take these decisions unanimously but you always have professional advice when it comes to

questions like this. somewhere down this line lies the mistake. the mistake was made. it led immediately to general allan coming forward yesterday morning and apologizing in the way that i said in my initial statement. we basically have to wait for the results of the investigation on where what went wrong. >> those orders you are referring to were issued yesterday. at the time of the incident, what were the standing orders for the handling of religious material? >> when it comes to dealing with religious material, we have the normal procedures that all nations of the coalition are doing in their pre deployment training and once on deployment. we have, of course, for all 50

nations that form isaf regulations that clearly bill would pre deployment training in cultural awareness. let us not forget that 60 of our 50 -- 6 the are 50 nations are actually muslim nations. when it comes to kabul it is a vital part of responsibility for the city. so there is a number of safety guards, there are cultural advisers on all levels and at all installations which of course in situations like this have to be asked. something as i said, went wrong. somewhere a decision was made that was highly inappropriate and that brought us into a situation which is very delicate, and what we have to do in the coming hours is trying to calm the situation closely

together with the situation of afghanistan, put a lid on violence that we have seen today and demonstrations, because we are very well aware of how culturally sensitive this action has been. >> can you tell us a little bit more about the investigation? how many afghans are involved, and are they from a police unit or an army unit or other government agency? how many coalition forces are involved in that? have you been given any advice by the afghan authorities on what the coalition needs to do to try to alleviate concerns that are in blaming the violence as a result of this?

>> we have obviously been in close contact with the number of ministries, reaching from the ministry of religious affairs to the security ministry the national department of security and the ministry of the interior. it is basically in the call to that ministry of the interior that form the african " -- the part of the delegation that looked into the case today. there were other advisers there. it was a mixed delegation. i cannot give you the exact number of members that were in this delegation. we expect in the hours of this evening to come out with the statement as soon as we are aware of the material that was found, the documentation that was done, and actually what the findings were. we hope the latest by early tomorrow morning will come out

with a very clear statement on what we see has happened on the ground. >> general i wonder if you could elaborate just a little more on the nature of the cultural and religious sensitivity training that the troops received, both before and after deployment, and how will that differ from what general allen has ordered? >> general allan's order of yesterday's deal specifically with the consequences that have to be drawn out of this incident. that is that somewhere in the chain of command for it right down to the personnel who were given the order to dispose of this material, somebody did not recognize the importance and the nature of the material which right from the beginning should have led to the involvement of

crawl through advisers. we have translators afghans on every level and we have afghan workers with us on every level. the training of forces before their deployment and their training on deployment are regulated by the contributing nations, but they all involve cultural awareness. as i said, we have a considerable number of muslim members in the coalition and we are working together on a daily basis with afghans. 130,000 soldiers in the coalition, with 3000 afghan national security forces who were going out sometimes in the most extreme situations and conditions. in general we are quite confident that the measures we are taking pre deployment and on deployment, are sufficient. on this that we have seen a mistake, and in this case we have seen ms. judgements --

misjuedgment, were gone and should have been asked for not happening, and that led to the stretchingtragic mistake. a mistake that has considerable consequences, and we have seen that in the demonstrations over the last 48 hours. >> do you know if those religious materials had extremas contents? and that was the reason to remove them from the library and to burn them? -- had extremist contents? >> we heard about this, and that

is one of the contents of the investigation that was ordered. we have to find out what led to the decision, what was the chain that then followed, who said what. this has to all be destroyed or whatever that led to the transport of the material to the bond pit but we also have to look into the reason for the decision, and that will include looking at material that was secured and in that respect, it is good that the majority of the material has been secured. what was actually the reason for this? was it leaflets including leaflets that house inflammatory material? what the pamphlets, and how did korans come into the amount of material that was then taken to the burn it. these are the questions we have

to answer and these are the questions that the investigation team to within this morning. this is what's we look forward to commenting on as soon as we have the answers available. >> do you know the number of material that has been burned? >> again that is something we can only find out when we hear the report. the important thing is that we do know and we do see that korans were at least charred. we see improper treatment of korans but we do see that they were part of the material that was delivered for burning. we have to look at how much was then the fire. we have to talk to the local workers who intervened and took

the material out. i have seen reports today that a worker come forward and said he actually burn his hands by pulling the material out and saving it. it was an amount that was delivered as normal material for destruction by soldiers who had been given the orders, and somewhere down the chain, as i said earlier somebody did not realize how delicate and sensitive and how important this material was, and how much it needed to be at least in conversation with cultural advisers and told what to do with what and how to dispose of what, and what procedures would have to be. a mistake -- because the mistake was made and the gravity of the mistake, general allan came forward so quickly after day and immediately took the action that

led to the orders that were passed down yesterday. i understand everything is under investigation and your still trying to figure everything out but many of us here yesterday were told that the korans had already been desecrated, that prisoners had been riding in them. just simply yes or no, is that your understanding that some of them might have been written in by prisoners and used as a conduit to send messages between one and another. i notice go under investigation but is it your understanding that is one of the reasons they may have been set for destruction? >> i cannot give you a yes or no on this question, because i do have to see what the result of the investigation is. that is exactly why the investigation went up. that is exactly why the material was secured on the spot, under

observation of islamic authorities, and that is exactly why we did the process that we did today together with the afghan side, to stop any speculation that might lead to the wrong conclusion. if i could give you a yes or no it would make things a little easier for us. it would not change the situation on the streets, and we have to be very careful in what we do, what we say what we look at. this is a very sensitive subject, and we have to be exactly clear on what was found what was the reason for decisions that were taken, and it has to be done together with the afghans. so a yes or no at this point is not possible. >> as far as the situation on the street, can you tell us just simply what it is you are seeing there? how many afghans have been injured or killed in the protest today, and in what areas you are seeing the most out rage in the

country? >> let me quickly summarize the events over the last hours as most of us have watched also on television. what we have seen yesterday was an immediate demonstration, mimi outside -- mainly outside the detention facility. there were around 2000 demonstrators. there were attempts to enter the facility. there were some buyers. generally, overall not a very violent demonstration but when it came to the near penetration of part of the facility, we have seen the helicopters and the players that came from the helicopters, and we have seen the use of rubber bullets yesterday. all demonstrations ended and disbursed yesterday evening.

there were also small demonstrations in kabul. but today we have seen a small demonstration outside the detention facility, largely peaceful. we have seen approximately four demonstrations of size in kabul all between 205 hundred demonstrators, mainly in facilities that are used -- between 200 and 500 demonstrators. outside these facilities, we have seen acts of violence, burning tires stones thrown at the nichols and installations and we have seen it shots fired at some of the installations. isaf as seen no direct violence against it. we have not seen any serious casualties on the isaf saside.

there are casualties to the east and north of kabul in similar demonstrations. local demonstrations demonstrations in numbers in the hundred have seen acts of violence in various areas, and unfortunately we have seen casualties. as we are well aware of the fact that the potential of this incident, everything has to be done in close cooperation, and is done in close cooperation with the security ministry but also across the board, with other instances of the afghan government and the religious community in afghanistan to calm down these demonstrations, to publish as much of the truth as quickly as possible, to be as visible as possible, to stop

this so that no more lives are lost over this incident. >> to step back to the issue of the burned korans themselves, who actually has possession of them right now? investigators have full access, and windy think we could maybe see images that show whether they were previously written on by insurgents in custody? >> that will not happen before we get the results of the investigation. as i said, i expect with the report that is coming back this evening or tonight, video footage and a photographic images which will probably give us the answer to the question that you have just asked. what we have seen mainly in the

demonstrations yesterday was that their ware were korans that were obviously charged. but what was inside and whether there was writing whether there was any improper use of this material before hand, and that led to the decision, that has to be seen. that has to be the result of the investigation, and that is why it has been executed over this day in the way that i have described. >> is it clear where these korans actually are? are they distributed among the crowd, or in one central location? where are they? >> what we have seen in the hands of those who were in the demonstration was probably taken out by the workers.

the incident came to public knowledge when the night shift that was there when the burning occurred left work and they told those who came in what they had seen, what had happened in the night, and that is when material at the facility. everything else when the process was stopped was handed over an overlooked by islamic and afghan authorities. where the entire material is at the moment i cannot answer. i would think that the majority will be still at the detention facilities and that parts will come back with the investigation team to kabul but i am going into speculation and i cannot tell you actually what is where at this very moment. >> i have two questions. you spoke about acts of violence. is one that has been brought to your attention as fallout to koran burning a local afghan

worker who has been beheaded? second question, have these types of incidents happened before? are you confident that they have or have not? >> to the first question, there have been a lot of very inflammatory reports very quickly, and unfortunately yester day we saw four the headings by taliban which had nothing to do with incident -- with this incident, which had to do with poor people who they called thighs, so the word be heading made it into the papers. definitely there have been no reports of the headings or in the act like that in the course of today. -- no reports of the headings or anything like that in the course of today.

what i am aware of that began at the place of penetration, we have seen three rubber bullets fired at the detention facility, but no legal force was used. that is to that point. when it comes to has this ever happened before, not to my knowledge have we ever seen the desecration of the koran in a way that is similar to this incident. again, i can only repeat, this desecration was basically an intentional. it happened down the chain of command by misjudgment of the situation, i miss judgment of the material. was a mistake. -- by eight misjudgment of the material. >> i am going to limit it to two, so we will wrap up on our end. >> you said these korans were

probably taken out by the workers. doesn't that raise questions of the security at the facility, that these could be taken out by the workers? >> i would say to the contrary local workers are operating the burning pits. it is a sign of the fact that actually was a mistake that this material was treated like normal material. that was a mistake, that somebody down the line did not recognize the type of material that he was dealing with. the sensitivity that went along with it pick perhaps not even knowing that korans were involved in this.

this is what we have to find out in the investigation. the fact that it was brought to the normal destruction facility where paper is destroyed and where the afghan work force is working and they are destroying this material, while those who bring it to the facilities are present, is just showing normal procedures. this means that material, paper material that it is decided should be destroyed first is brought by personnel to this it and the afghan work force operates the facility. there are afghan workers in every facility we are operating from laundry's right across to assistance that and our office, we are working together, shoulder by shoulder, every day. that comes next to the question of cultural understanding. i would not say there is a security breach here. it shows that basically the

people who are handling this material were not aware of the sensitivity of what they were actually doing. >> i could ask more broadly what kind of strategic setback do you think this incident poses for isaf's campaign? whether it is intentional or unintentional, it seems to confirm a lot of the taliban propaganda about the motives of not islamic forces in afghanistan. do you see this resonating for a long time to come? >> without going into speculation on long-term effects, we are obviously aware about the greatness of what has happened and the greatness of this incident. desecrating mistreating the koran is a grave incident in the

muslim world, and as we are not only here to protect human rights but also religious freedom, and obviously here to protect the people of afghanistan and the way they live and what they believe in, this is a grave incident. we have seen the implications, the understandable anger the people of afghanistan about what they have seen and heard. the important thing is now that we are all together, together with afghan authorities and the people of afghanistan treating this with the necessary care, explain to the people as much as possible that mistakes were made, and as i said in my initial statement, if we do find there are responsibilities down the line yes there will be legal consequences to this, and we have to look into this in detail. it is important that we deal with this rightly in the coming hours. what is important orisaf and for

the government and people of afghanistan is that violence does not flair that this is not used to enflame the people of afghanistan, that this is not used to drive a wedge between the people that we are working closely with on a very databases. the afghan national security forces, side by side with us, on operations and very dangerous mission on a day-to-day basis. trainers who are training afghan personnel in every aspect, not only in the securities sector. we are very close to each other and therefore is of the utmost importance that we explain very clearly what happened explain how sorry we are about what happened explained that this was a mistake, explain what led to it, and talk about the consequences. >> general jacobsen, we are extremely grateful that you took the time to spend with us here this evening.

we invite you to come here in person if that opportunity presents itself the chicken come back to washington. i think he would like to come back and visit where you once served as the military attache. again, thank you. have a good evening. >> next time, under better circumstances. thank you. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2012] >> primetime tonight on the c- span networks, a discussion from the world economic forum in dock boats, switzerland on the role of women in government and business. desmond tutu participate along

with the prime minister of thailand. book tv prime time again that 7:00 eastern with live coverage would talk about a book by author david on yourunger. the smithsonian museum in washington is getting a new museum. ground was broken today on the 19th, the african-american history and culture museum in a vote to open in 2015. obama participated in the ground breaking ceremony. you can see the entire event tonight on c-span. . the 20-minute preview. >> is an honor to be here with all these distinguished guests

and wonderful friends who are here. it is a remarkable day. at the smithsonian, we strive to provide a lens through which america can see the world and indeed the world can see america. today that picture come sharply into focus. the national museum of african- american history and culture at the essential chapters to the essential american story. voices silenced in the past will be heard here and now, and in the future. we realize this dream this lifelong dream, thanks to the generosity of the administration the congress, and the american people. working together, we bring america's treasures to parents, teachers learners of all ages across the country, around the world, and best of all it is all free. [applause]

no inflation here. the museum director had a staff of exactly two and zero optics. no concrete has been poor, but the team has already created a strong foundation for it. today he has more than 20,000 artifacts, in addition to education programs and vibrant exhibitions. in 2015, visitors will be witness to history when this new building opens the doors -- to america and the world. it will join our 18 other smithsonian museums which tell the stories of all the people who made this country great. our existing museum and the secretary will support lani at this museum, allowing us to fully speak to african-americans contributions and art history culture, and finance.

many thanks to lonnie and his colleagues the museum's advisory council all of our region, and for helping bring this project to permission. we are honored to welcome president and mrs. obama. thank you for being with us. [applause] thank you so much for encouraging and supporting this and many other smithsonian initiatives. we are here today thanks to the leadership of many. president and mrs. bush were essential. members of the house and senate and a host of local officials made it happen. this was a true bipartisan effort echoing the message of unity. what a magnificent location, is imbued with powerful symbolism. it is fitting home for this museum invoking the indelible breadth that connect the fabric of the african-american story to

the american tapestry. even as we break ground on the national mall, i want to ensure the entire country that we reach far beyond the nation's capital. it cannot come to us, we come to do through new technology and our 170 affiliate museum located around the country an hour traveling exhibitions. to the teachers and students who were watching, imagine your school and a few years and what you might receive in terms of information from this museum. maybe a hologram of martin luther king could walk off the screen and into your classroom. thanks to technology, the leaders of the world of tomorrow have the world in their hands today. to this day we add to america's chorus of voices, voices that

inspire us to recall the past and illuminate the present, and ensure a better future for all. thank you very much. >> please welcome a valued friend of the smithsonian ms. laura bush. >> thank you all, everybody. thank you very much. thank you very much for that introduction. good morning to everyone. good morning president and mrs. obama. thank you to all our distinguished guests and all americans who have joined us for this very important occasion. it is especially fitting that we

are dedicating this land on our national mall for a museum that remembers, revered, and celebrates the great struggles an even greater contributions that african-americans have made to our nation's history. just down the road from here, but the white house and the capital were built in part by the labor of african-american slave. we don't know most of their names but they left a lasting legacy in the bricks and stones and beautiful craftsmanship that now house are democracy's most vital institutions. hear, too, in this city is where a young congressman named abraham lincoln was horrified by the sight of a slave pens standing near the grounds of the capital. a year later president lincoln would sign the transforming

emancipation of proclamation. here is where the great abolitionist, fredrick douglas came to offer counsel to lincoln. it was welcomed by the president into the white house. here on this very mall is where the rev. martin luther king, jr., stood and cheered his dream of a nation where we are all measured by the content of our character and where we join together at one table, the table of brotherhood. here in this city is also where president lyndon johnson fought for and signed the landmark civil rights act of 1964. today, african-americans helped lead our nation in all facets of life from government to the military to the law from business to the arts to medication. this museum will share those stories and pay tribute to the many lives known and unknown

that have so immeasurably reached our nation. the fabric of american history and culture began as a bipartisan effort through legislation sponsored by john lewis and max cleveland. my husband, president bush was proud to sign it into law in 2003. and to envision the museum to be built on the mall where we honor artists, inventors, explorers, soldiers, and statesman. i am particularly proud of the museum's vision which is dedicated not simply to this building, but also to reaching out to communities around the nation. the museum has already begun traveling exhibitions and artifact preservation programs.

it is a museum dedicated to welcoming all americans, whether or not they will be able to travel to washington, d.c. i am glad, too, that this building will stand next to the monument to our first president george washington. a man who fought for liberty and two came to recognize the evil of bondage, freeing his slaves in his will. side by side, these two spots are symbolic of our own national journey. for the stories that will be preserved within these walls the stories of suffering and perseverance, of darien, of imagination, and of triumph are the stories of african americans. but there also stories that are for ever woven through the heart of the fabric of our nation. thank you all and god bless you all. [applause]

>> is my honor to introduce a friend, a scholar, a two-time this is, and morris apparently a new chair of the smithsonian board and my boss, christopher douglas. [applause] >> mr. president, mrs. obama honored guests, good morning. on behalf of the board, i would like to welcome all of you here to this incredible ceremony. i would like to also congratulate the council of

american history and culture. the museum's dedicated staff and the founding director lonnie bunch on achieving this historic milestone. [applause] that we are breaking ground for the construction of the museum's permanent home is a testament of a shared vision and hard work. in 2003 they were honored when congress passed and bush signed legislation establishing the national museum of african- american history and culture within the smithsonian. since that time, the regents have made opening the museum our number one priority. the legislation also passed regents with want to be

particularly relevant to our gathering today. we were asked to six -- to select the site for the new museum. over the course of two years, we listen to a passionate discourse on the museum through public town halls and on the internet. we consulted closely with the museum council and other stakeholders. we considered a number of attractive alternatives, but in the end, our decision was easy. we recognize that the story of african-american culture and history is essential to the story of america. it is a story that we believe can be best told from america's front yard -- the national mall. here, at the foot of the national monument. next to the museum of american history, in view of the capital, and within blocks of the white house. sometimes location is indeed everything.

this side underscores the smithsonian and the nation's commitment to telling the whole american story. as a scientist and educator, i was taken with some recent photographs of president obama hosting students at a science fair at the white house. by opening the white house doors to outstanding young student scientists, the president sends an important and inspiring message to young americans. that science and learning are critical to the future of this nation and a top priority for us all. [applause] since 1846, the smithsonian has been opening its doors to scientists, artists, or those just seeking to learn more about themselves, the nation,

and the world. we are grateful to the president and mrs. obama for their inspiring support of education, the smithsonian, and it's wonderful and important new museum. it is now my great honor and privilege to welcome the president of the united states. [applause] >> thank you. [applause] thank you. thank you so much. [applause] thank you so much. [applause] thank you very much. [applause] good morning, everybody. i want to thank france for that introduction and for her

leadership at the smithsonian. i want to thank everybody who helps make this day happen. i want to thank laura bush, secretary salazar, sam, my hero congressman john lewis, wayne clough, everyone who is made this possible. i am so proud of lonnie who came here from chicago, i want to point out. [applause] i remember having a conversation with him about this job when he was starting to embark on an extraordinary journey. i cannot be more proud of the work he has done. i promised to do my part by being briefed. as others have mentioned this day has been a long time coming. the idea for a museum dedicated

to african-americans was first put forth by black veterans of the civil war. years later the call was picked up by members of the civil- rights generation. by men and women who knew how to fight for what is right and prescribe for what is just. this is their day. this is your day. it is an honor to be here to see the fruits of your labor. it is also fitting that this museum has found a home on the national mall. as has been mentioned, it was on this ground long ago that lives were once traded. where hundreds of thousands once marched for jobs for freedom. it was here that the pillars of our democracy were built often by black hands. it was a long piece -- it was along the spite of the monuments for those who gave birth to this